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Abstract 
The focus is on the Mekong River Commission‟s (MRC) governance of the resources of the Mekong River 
and its tributaries. The great economic growth over the last years in the South East Asia has increased the 
demand for energy correspondingly. The way to fulfill these increased energy demands is to a large extent 
expected to be meet through the generation of hydroelectric energy. In the last two decades hydropower 
dams have been constructed on the Mekong tributaries with huge consequences for the surroundings, and not 
more than a month ago was the Nam Theun II dam in Lao PDR completed both altering the flow of the river 
up- and downstream, with consequences for over 120.000 peoples living along its banks. 
The MRC was finally established by Thailand, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam in 1995, with the goal to 
secure a sustainable development and an equal utilization of resources between the four member states. 
However, an investigation of the structure of the MRC and the formulations of the mutual agreement, has 
given a clear indication that the MRC in practical terms does not have any authoritative to approve or 
disapprove proposed projects. 
Most recently the MRC has been asked to assist in the formulation of a Strategic Impact Assessments on 11 
hydropower proposals on the Mekong Mainstream. However evidence indicates that projects are so far 
ahead, that the conclusions here will be of no importance to the decision makers. The question is whether the 
MRC member states are prepared to delegate sovereignty to the mutual governance for a sustainable 
development in the future? - or whether they will keep utilizing the resources until total depletion? – the 
tragedy of the commons.       
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Map over the Greater Mekong Subregion 
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1. Problem field 
The four South East Asian countries, Thailand, Vietnam, Lao PDR, and Cambodia have all experienced great 
economic growth in the last years which naturally has increased the demand for energy correspondingly. To 
supply the industry with energy in a long-term economic (and environmental) sustainable way, energy 
sources which can replace fossil fuels are needed. The four states are to a large extent, seeing hydroelectric 
energy from hydropower dams as a part of the solution.  
Construction of hydropower dams is not a new thing in South East Asia, but has been discussed over the last 
four decades (International Rivers, 2009). Hitherto the construction of dams has however been taken place 
on the Lancang Cascade in the Upper Mekong Basin (UMB) in China and at the Mekong River‟s tributaries 
in the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB), but recently the construction of 11 dams on the mainstream of the 
Lower Mekong River (LMR) are now being investigated (MRC, 2010). For years proposed dam-projects on 
the mainstream was refused without further consideration because of the uncertain consequences to the 
ecology of the river that might follow. Former cautiousness has apparently been flouted. Critics have warned 
that the river basin‟s sensitive ecosystem might collapse if the proposals are going through. The effects will 
among others be the following unpredictability of water flows, which will result in diminishing fish stocks 
and affect traditional agricultural production negatively, with huge consequences for the 65+ millions of 
people living on the riverbanks (International Rivers, 2009). 
If this criticism proved to be correct there are no doubts that the local population along the river is the most 
affected by the consequences of the hydropower projects and might only have limited gains. Naturally states 
will benefit from the hydropower development; some by fulfilling increasing needs for energy, and others by 
earning important revenue to the developing economies. If the dams will be constructed, it is difficult to 
predict to what extent farmers and the fishermen depending on the resources of the river, can cope with these 
immediate changes.  
In an attempt to avoid unequal utilisation of the resources of the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB), the states of 
Vietnam, Lao PDR, Cambodia and Thailand have agreed to incorporate a joint collaboration to promote a 
“...sustainable development, utilization, management and conservation of the water and related resources of 
the Mekong River Basin...” (MRC, 1995).  This transboundary collaboration between the four states is called 
the “Mekong River Commission” (MRC). Besides supporting sustainable dam-projects, the MRC‟s task is to 
work on adaptation strategies to climate changes and poverty alleviation within all its components (MRC, 
2010). All in all the MRC has as such been granted a huge responsibility to support sustainable development.  
However, recently the MRC has received a lot of criticism saying it lacks sufficient power and legitimacy to 
control the utilisation of the LMB‟s resources. Experience has shown that they are prone to emphasize 
development projects with focus on economic growth, higher than the ecological sustainability (Hirsch, et 
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al., 2006). In this report we wish to look deeper into the limits of the MRC and on the obstacles that the 
MRC is facing in the goal to support “...sustainable benefits to all riparian States…” (MRC, 2010).   
1.1 Problem area 
The MRC has been granted the task to assess the 11 pending projects on the Mekong River mainstream. The 
ongoing assessment of the consequences on hydropower projects is, as predicted, foretelling severe 
consequences for the river basin‟s ecosystem. The assessments are not completed yet, but the question 
however remains; are the MRC actually capable of setting the agenda and effectively secure a sustainable 
use of the Mekong River over immediate economic growth, fiscal interests and the region‟s need for energy? 
Further; is the Commission able to secure that the local populations will be heard and will be taken into 
consideration when the final decision is made?  
Comprehensive hydropower development has already been completed on the Mekong River‟s tributaries. 
Most recently (October 2009) the Nam Theun II (NT2) project in Laos was finished as a model project to 
pave the way for best practice hydropower development in the region, financed among others by the World 
Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. The NT2 is not only the most recent, but also the largest 
hydropower project and the biggest foreign investment in Lao PDR to date. Seen in the light that it should 
demonstrate best practice for hydropower development, the NT2 has received relatively much criticism. 
This leads us to the following research question; 
1.2 Research question 
With an offset in the planning and implementation of the Nam Theun II hydropower project in Lao PDR, 
how can the Mekong River Commission be strengthened to effectively secure a sustainable utilization of the 
Mekong River Basin‟s resources in the future? 
1.3 Sub-questions 
1. Why is the ecology of the river important to sustain? 
2. Which role did the MRC play in the Nam Theun II project?  
3. What is the current role of the MRC in the Mekong River Basin and what are the critics? 
4. How can a common-pool resource effectively and sufficiently be governed in order to promote a 
sustainable use of its resources? 
5. How can the MRC be strengthened in order to become a heard player in the Mekong River decision-
making processes? 
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2. Method  
The purpose of this chapter is to establish a coherent understanding of the focus of the report. Initially the 
exposition of the focus of the report will serve to give the reader an understanding of the reports motivation 
and driving force, implicitly herein is also the report‟s demarcations. Afterwards we will give an overview of 
the project design and the theoretical considerations. 
2.1 Focus 
In this section we will clarify the report‟s main focus with a take-off in the above problem formulation and 
its sub-questions. 
The research question of the report is divided in two parts; a problem-oriented part: “With an offset in the 
planning and implementation of the Nam Theun II hydropower project in Lao PDR”, and a solution-oriented 
part “how can the Mekong River Commission be strengthened to effectively secure a sustainable utilization 
of the Mekong River Basin’s resources in the future?”.  
In the problem-oriented part the starting point is the former development projects at the Mekong River Basin, 
especially, but not exclusively, we wish to draw the attention to the just finished Nam Theun II (NT2) 
hydropower project in Lao PDR.  The special focus on the dams has several reasons; 1) The building of 
hydropower dams has by several critics been called the biggest threat to the river‟s ecology, suggesting 
unpredictable, but yet massive, losses in fish stocks, comprehensive negative consequences for agriculture 
and extensive resettlement of populations (International Rivers, 2009; Osborne, 2004; Middleton, 2009). 2) 
Further emphasizing the need to look at the hydropower dams, is the, in spite of the criticism, newly initiated 
investigation of 11 hydropower dams on the Mekong River mainstream, which the MRC has been requested 
to assess. The power of the MRC to affect the order of business can be crucial, shall the sustainability of the 
Mekong River‟s ecology be taken into consideration, alongside goals of economic growth and a growing 
need for electricity.  3) The building of dams has several national, international players as well as 
corporations with each their interest and objective in the building of the dams. The case of dams will provide 
a picture of where the MRC is placed in the „landscape‟ of stakeholders. 4) Lastly the goal of the MRC is to 
achieve more effective use of water and water related resources in order to alleviate poverty while protecting 
the environment. Problematically, the hydropower dams will primarily support the cities need for electricity 
and state economy, whilst the immediate consequences are felt among the vast majority of the people in 
especially Cambodia and Laos who live in rural areas and rely on the river and the resources it provides 
which is essential to sustain their livelihoods (Middleton, 2009). Hence the building of dams in its nature 
seems to undermine the goal of MRC to alleviate poverty. 
We have chosen the Nam Theun II, Don Sahong and Se San dam as cases for the paper. These three cases 
partly supplement each other by emphasize different conflicts between the riparian states and partly underpin 
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the major limits of the MRC‟s governance. The NT2 case is the by now biggest and newest hydropower 
project and was lauded as a model project to pave the way for best practice hydropower development in the 
region. Interesting is that the World Bank, the ADB, the European Investment Bank and Agence Française 
de Développement where involved in the project, but that the MRC where not. The NT2 case can in this way 
be useful to examine the MRC‟s influence. The Don Sahong case distinguishes from the two latter cases, due 
to the fact that it has not been constructed yet, thus it is one of the 11 proposed dams on the Mekong 
mainstream. This case indicates how the initial project-planning proceed and in this which role the MRC 
play. The Se San-case represents several constructed dams on the Se San River over the last two decades and 
illustrates how disputes among stats are prevalent, and the MRC‟s ability to handle these disputes.  So 
saying, the three cases point out different limits of the MRC and the 1995 Agreement likewise they show 
how national interests are prevailing. Each of the cases has its own peculiarities which provide the 
conclusions of the report with increased validity.      
Implicit in the research question is a pretty clear pre-understanding, that the MRC currently is unable to 
handle its appointed task, and we want to investigate this by questioning whether the MRC currently holds a 
strong card in the decision-making processes concerning the utilization of the River Basin‟s resources, and/or 
whether decisions are being settled without the MRC‟s involvement? This will give us the opportunity to 
assess its power to affect the agenda concerning the current 11 proposed project on the mainstream. And 
further help us understand which role the MRC might play in future developments.  
In the solution-oriented part we are focussing on what can be done internally to arm the MRC in order to 
support its goal to effectively manage the MRB‟s resources in a sustainable way. We are once again taking 
our takeoff in the presented cases, but will draw in various theories on the governing of the commons. The 
theory outline will be discussed explicitly later in this chapter.  
There are a lot of different stakeholders, which all have their specific objectives, in the area around the MRB. 
Despite that, we have decided to put our primary effort into an analysis of the MRC and how to strengthen 
this transboundary cooperation, due to the fact that the four member countries have establish the MRC to 
support a sustainable development. China is not a member of the MRC, and will therefore not be discussed – 
however we do not want to neglect the significance of the fact that they are not, and that their commitment to 
the MRC would mean a lot. What makes the MRC interesting is not, least of all, that the Danish International 
Development Agency, Danida, has put a lot of effort in the last decade into strengthening it, which tells us 
that they are seeing the MRC as an important stakeholder too. However, we are aware that the MRC might 
not be the best option to secure sustainable utilization of the river‟s resources. This will receive more 
attention and be discussed in the final chapters of this paper.  
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It is mention worthy, that our field of research is just a cornerstone in a much broader discussion on how to 
sustainably develop the region and meet the region‟s energy demands in an appropriate way. Therefore we 
do not want to neglect the importance or ignore the significant possibilities of economic development - 
especially in developing countries like Thailand, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam. However, we believe 
that a long term sustainable utilization of the MRB‟s resources is vital to the regions positive development, 
favouring the millions of people living here. 
Conclusively we want to make it clear, that it is not the aim of the report to present a full and detailed 
solution-oriented framework ready to implement. Instead we are striving to point out where changes in the 
internal structures and decision making processes of MRC can be necessary or beneficial.  
2.2 Project design 
Below is the project design, which purpose is to give the reader an understanding of how the project is 
structured according to our focus- and research area.  
 
Here follows a short introduction to the above:  
1. Project field and Research Question 
2. Methodology 
 
3. Field analysis: The problem field has outlined our motivation and some of the development 
trends which are threatening the ecology of the Mekong River. These challenges calls for 
collaborative action, which leads us to the problem investigated. However to understand the 
contemporary problems, we need to understand the complex MRB‟s ecological situation; what is 
threatening it, whom is being affected and how development one place, has consequences 
another. The chapter will discharge into the discussion of hydropower dams in the next chapter, 
by way of looking at the consequences of these. 
Focus 1:
(Nam Theun 2 and 
others)
Focus 2: 
(Mekong River 
Commission)
Chapter 7
Theoretical
framework
Chapter 3-6:
Field Analysis: 
(Geography, the current 
state of the river, and 
future challenges)
Chapter 8:
Final Analysis
and Suggestions
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4. Focussing 1: Initially we are outlining the overall trends regarding the construction of 
hydropower dams in MRB, to understand the current movements and the main interests.  
 
5. Cases: When this is done, special focus is drawn to a few cases. Especially the Nam Theun II 
(NT2) hydropower project in Lao PDR. The NT2 was finished in the first quarter of the current 
year, which gives us a very current snapshot of what is happening right now. Other examples 
have been included to give more light to this. The focus in the chapter is, besides the 
identification of interests and stakeholders, on the MRC influence in planning- and 
implementation process of these projects. 
 
6. Focussing 2: In this chapter we wish to focus on the intergovernmental Mekong River 
Commission. The MRC is interesting because it have been established by the riparian countries 
with a mandate to promote a sustainable use of the MRB‟s resources, whether it can manage this 
task have been elaborated in the former chapter, showing that it has a great deal of difficulty 
doing so. Hence, the chapter seeks examine why this is so, examining the correlation between 
the cases and the constituting 1995 Agreement. 
 
7. Theoretical framework: On the basis of the achieved knowledge about the poor governance of 
the MRB, we are now presenting different approaches to how to govern a CPR. Untraditionally 
the analytical framework is presented just before the final analysis. This is done, because the 
field analysis is very determining for the chosen theoretical approach. A further explanation for 
our choice of theory will be discussed in section 2.3.   
 
8. Analysis and suggestions: on the basis of the knowledge we have gained here, we are now able 
to create a picture of the MRC‟s role and influence in the MRB hydropower scene. Applying our 
theoretical framework, the focus is on the structure of the MRC and the power struggles between 
the MRC, its member states (paradoxically) and other stakeholders. This is done in order to 
come with suggestions to where, and how, the MRC can be strengthened. Finally the chapter 
discusses alternative solutions, which could benefit the fragile ecosystem of the Mekong River. 
 
9. Conclusions 
10. Appendix  
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2.3 Choice of theory and theory outline 
In the field analysis of the report (chapter 3,4 and 5) we are analysing ad hoc. Finally and conclusively on 
chapter 5, we are summing up the conclusions made so far. This has been determining for choosing the 
theoretical framework, and this is also the reason, the theoretical framework untraditionally is presented so 
late in the report (chapter 6). 
In this short section we explain the report‟s theoretical framework and justify our choices. The report‟s 
theoretical framework does not consist of one specific theory or one theoretical direction but is compounded 
by several directions in order to achieve holistic conclusions.  
This chapter will initially discuss the common-pool resource concept, and justify our use of it, before shortly 
investigating the known concept of „tragedy of the commons‟ presented in 1968 by Garrett Hardin. Hardin 
concludes the need for clear regulation which means that states will have to surrender sovereignty. 
Therefore, his argument is backed up by a discussion on, what makes states surrender it? The following 
approaches take offspring in the socio-psychological way of thinking, among others represented by Mark 
Van Vugt. These approaches will be discussed in the analysis on how to strengthen the MRC. 
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3. The Mekong River - its role and development 
By way of introduction, we wish to present the current state of the Mekong River Basin, the river basin‟s 
ecological situation, what is threatening it, whom is being affected and how the river constitutes one big 
ecosystem, where changes one place, can have crucial consequences another place.   
The chapter will also provide the reader with an overview of the range of needs the river currently supports. 
The river‟s ability to fulfil these needs is what we relate to, when we refer to the capability to maintain a 
sustainable ecosystem in the future. Agricultural production and fisheries are currently being severely 
affected, and the future only suggests that the pressure on the farming and fish-stocks will rise dramatically. 
The outlook of a breakdown in the region‟s ability to provide livelihood for a growing population must be 
dealt with. The chapter will discharge into the discussion of hydropower dams in the next chapter. 
3.1 Geography 
The Mekong River is, with its approximately 4880km, the longest river in South East Asia (SEA). It origins 
from an elevation of 5100m in the Eastern Tibet and the Western province of Qing Hai in China, from where 
it runs through the Southern China‟s Yunnan province, through, Myanmar, Thailand, Lao PDR, Cambodia 
and Vietnam before it discharges into the South China Sea.  
 
(Source: Rivers at Risk, Milton Osborne, 2004) 
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The river drains an area of about 0.795 x 10
6
 km
2
. Of the total drainage stems 16% from China, 2% from 
Myanmar, 15% from Thailand, 35% from Lao PDR, 11% from Cambodia and 18% from Vietnam (Osborne, 
2004). The yearly discharge from the river into the Mekong River Delta (MRD) amounts to 5 x 10
11
 m
3
, 
making it in terms of the volume of water released the 8
th
 largest river in the world. Of this discharge 85%, 
occurs in the wet season, from May to October, and the remaining 15% in the dry season. The yearly 
sediment discharge from the river amounts to 1.6 x 10
8
 tons year
-1 
(Hoa, et al., 2007). 
The upper section of the river, which is located in China, is called the Lanchang River or the „Turbulent 
River‟. The majority of its 2161 kilometres runs through steep gorges in areas which are ill-suited for 
settlement. This provides China with ideal conditions for the construction of dams. However, Chinas actual 
use of water is territorially limited to the water that leaves China, the construction of dams upstream, does 
now seem to impose a serious threat to the flow of the entire river. Some suggest up to 40% of the river‟s 
total volume in the dry season (Osborne, 2004 s. 2). The seriousness is further underlined by the fact that 
85% of both Lao PDR and Cambodia‟s national territory lies within the MRB (Hoa, et al., 2007).  
3.2. Dependency and recent developments  
Eight out of ten people living in the MRB is estimated to be dependent on the river for subsistence, whether 
it is through fishery or agriculture. In Cambodia a total 70% of the population‟s intake of animal protein 
stems from fish. A further 71% of Lao PDR‟ rural households are dependent on fishing to sustain their 
livelihood, and 50% of the agricultural contribution to Vietnam‟s GDP is generated in the Mekong Delta. 
(MRC, 2003).  
Between 60 and 70 million people is estimated to live in the MRB, however population trends suggest that 
this number will rise significantly in the coming years. It is estimated that the population of the MRB will 
grow to an approximate of 90 million by 2025 (MRC, 2003 s. 18), and especially Cambodia and Lao PDR 
stands out in this connection with trends foreseeing a doubling of the population in the next 20 years (Hook, 
et al., 2003 s. 27), suggesting an even bigger pressure and dependency on the river in the future. 
All along the river, from China in the north to Vietnam in the south, an increasing number of changes have 
been registered over the last decade. Further an important aspect to keep in mind is that changes can take 
tens to hundreds of years before it is starting to show, as the entire ecology of the river is linked in a complex 
ecosystem. Hence, changes are therefore linked, and cause chain reactions that cascade through second- and 
third-order effects. (Richter, et al., 2003). 
3.2.1 Fisheries and dam development 
The annual pattern of flood and draught plays an important role for the people living in the basin, and the 
river basin‟s ecology as a whole. In relation to fisheries, the large floodplains are basically the heart of origin 
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in relation to the extensive fisheries in the river. Not only do they represent important refugee habitats for 
fish in the dry season, but what is more important is that they during this period also constitute crucial 
nursery habitats. Although many different types of habitats exists along the river, they are all linked in what 
can be seen as a big fish migration network, where fish migration corridors connects downstream nursery 
habitats with upstream spawning habitats, and further dry season refuge habitats in the mainstream with 
feeding habitats on the floodplains in the wet season. These migration patterns are crucial for fisheries all 
along the rivers (MRC, 2003). 
In 2004, in the Capital of Lao PDR, Vientiane, the depth of the river was measured to be the lowest ever. 
Other places in the north have reported similar discoveries, while water levels in the south, below Phnom 
Penh, apparently have remained fairly stable. A development the MRC seems to connect with the building of 
dams in China. Lao PDR is not the only country which has observed recently changes in the river flows, but 
also in the north of Thailand, around Chiang Saen, the media by April 2004 started to report, that boats 
began to go aground. (Osborne, 2004 s. viii). The problem in this relation is that the seasonal increase and 
decrease in the volume of the lakes, as it has happened the last years, is known to influence the bounty of fish 
in the river dramatically. When changes in water flows, such as timing, volume and duration occurs, fish that 
spawn in the dry season, might not be able to find suitable breeding places or their eggs may be washed away 
due to irregular strong water flows in the dry season. 
Special attention must here be paid to the importance of the biggest of these breeding habitats; the Tonle Sap 
River in Cambodia. During the wet season also this river turns into an immense breeding ground, and in late 
October when the dry season sets in, at least 50.000 fish is calculated to pour out of the Tonle Sap into the 
Mekong River every minute (MRC, 2003 s. 19). Alarmingly recent changes are also begging to show its 
gravity on the fisheries here. Quantitatively the catch in the Tonle Sap, declined by 15% in 2001, and another 
added 15% in 2002 – further, by April 2004, the fishing season of 2003 ended at its worst ever, with reports 
suggesting a decrease of as much as an alarming added 50% compared to just one year earlier. (Osborne, 
2004 s. viii). The changes in water flows are most likely, as MRC suggests, the consequence of dam 
development on the tributary that connects Tonle Sap with the Mekong River (MRC, 2003). 
3.2.2 Agriculture and the importance of the predictable floods 
In relation to agriculture and horticulture, dealing with the regular and fairly predictable floods has been a 
way of living for people in the basin for generations. Today the floods play an important role in fertilizing 
the agricultural land, as the flooding in the wet season carries silt which is deposited on the riverbanks, 
making them extremely fertile. The same is the case for the deposits of nutrients, which is of special 
importance to the basin agricultural fields. Further to this the floods also yield the benefit of rinsing the soil 
from accumulated alkaloids, and ridding rice fields of pests such as rats. (Osborne, 2004 s. 17-23). As just 
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mentioned, the building of dams on the river or its tributaries will alter the important predictable flood 
patterns, with following unpredictable consequences for agricultural production here.  
3.3 The collapse of the river’s ecosystem 
The ecology and nature of the almost 5000km long river is, must as mentioned, be seen as a single complex 
organism, which character is dependent of the totality of the river; linked in a complicated network, with 
hundreds of factors, each playing their independent role. Being as it is, it can be difficult to put a finger on, 
what exactly is the origin for some happenings, while others naturally are more straight forward, and yet 
again other developments can be more or less precisely foreseen to happen in the future, as a consequence of 
this or that. Besides the building of dams on the river, a lot of other factors play a part as well. 
Among others an increase in strength of weather phenomenons, such as typhoons are affecting saline water 
to advancing further upstream, damaging fresh water used for drinking, cooking or traditional farming and 
increasing the number of incidents with saltwater intrusion, damaging crops along the riverbanks (Oxfam, 
2008). Further most experts are agreeing to a rise in sea levels, which indubitably also will allow saltwater to 
go further up the rivers, in the coming years. Not to mention permanent inundation of the lowlands 
necessitating the displacement tens of millions of people before the turn into the next century; especially in 
Vietnam and Cambodia. (Dasgupta, et al., 2007). 
Another factor is the various modifications done to improve navigation up and down the river, including 
blasting of rapids, islands and bars, construction of ports, and dredging of river beds. Until recently 
navigation on the river was extremely limited due to the many obstacles of the river. However, in 1990, the 
Greater Mekong Subregion
1
 program (GMS) decided among others, through a range of forums held, to make 
it possible for vessels up to 500 DWT
2
 to go from the Chinese Yunnan province to the Lao province Luang 
Prabang. This happened despite huge criticism from the Government of Lao PDR and the MRC on the basis 
on the evaluation of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) ordered (and apparently hugely influenced) 
by Chinese officials (Osborne, 2004 s. 25-30). The clearing of the river for navigation will have a huge 
impact on the aeration
3
 of the water in the river, and the natural fluctuations which is important for both the 
river‟s fauna and fish stocks. Further the clearing will naturally also affect the original habitats of the fish. So 
far the clearing of the river for navigation are mainly happening in China, but there is some tendencies 
suggesting that this will spread in the coming years. (Osborne, 2004 s. 28). 
Further to this a lot of other recent happening are threatening the rivers ecology (MRC, 2003, Osborne, 2004 
and Hoa, et al., 2007) 1) Of the flooded forests in Cambodia, 33% have been cut down mainly for fuel wood 
usage, but also to clear land for agriculture. The consequences are the devastation of many important 
                                                     
1
 The Greater Mekong Subregion comprises Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand China, Myanmar and Vietnam. The GMS is founded by the Asian Development 
Bank to enhance the economic relations among the six countries with special focus on infrastructure. (ADB, 2010).  
2
Dead Wieght Tonnage 
3
The process where air is mixed with water  
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spawning and feeding habitats for the fish. 2) The population in the MRB will most likely grow rapidly over 
the coming years. This will undoubtedly add to the already existing pressure of the region, 3) Increased 
deforestation along the riverbanks will increase erosion. This will further cause sediments to accumulate in 
the deep pools, which will irritate fish gels and smother fish eggs. Further there is a risk that deforestation 
can lead to a decrease in the amount of litter falling from the trees into the river, which originally have been 
an important part of the aquatic food chain. 4) Various fishing methods, for example the catching of fry to 
rise in ponds, fishing in the spawning season, and in refuge areas, and fishing with electricity, toxics or 
dynamite is all leaving its marks on the fish stocks of the Mekong River. 5) The introduction of new species 
to raise in ponds, may further cause new diseases and parasites, the loss of biodiversity as a result of 
hybridisation, displacement of original species and loss of genetic diversity and finally 6) Increased pollution, 
caused by fertilizer run-off and use of pesticides in agriculture, increasing the amount of nutrients in the 
water, deteriorating the quality of it, killing fish and increasing algae blooming. 
3.3.1 Hydropower Development 
Without neglecting these threats, the building of hydropower dams are by several scientists, NGO‟s and 
politicians considered the biggest immediate threat to the river‟s ecosystem (International Rivers, 2009; 
Osborne, 2004). There is an massive unexploited energy potential in the enormous amount of water running 
down the river, which potentially could ease the region‟s rapidly growing need for energy; especially in 
Vietnam and Thailand.  
However, the construction of dams leads with it many possible environmental and social consequences. 
(Kummu, et al., 2006; MRC, 2003; International Rivers, 2009): 
1. Decrease in fish stocks, due to;  
a. Changes in timing, duration and volume of water flows, especially affecting species that spawn in the 
dry season, and; 
b. Blocking of essential fish migration networks. 
2. Deterioration of agricultural land and biodiversity in general, as;  
a. Sediment accumulation in dams, might diminish the amount of valuable nutrient needed for example 
for agricultural activities along the river; 
b. Embankments might stop fine sediment flow into agricultural land, which is fertilizing the soil. 
c. Increased flooding caused by dams will cause erosion of agricultural land. 
3. Saltwater intrusion, ruining both agricultural possibilities and freshwater for drinking, as 
a. Saline water will travel further upstream, due to longer draught periods caused by holding back water 
in the basins of the dams  
b. Destruction of livelihoods and even drowning due to increased (and sudden unpredictable) flooding. 
These are just some of the possible threats related to the building of dams. On top of this, is for example the 
enormous displacement and resettlement of people necessitated by the building of dams. This displacement 
happens both upstream and downstream, respectively as the basin is filled with water and downstream due to 
volume changes caused by foods. To exemplify the magnitude with some of these projects, China is 
Roskilde University, Spring 2010: the Role of the Mekong River Commission – Nam Theun 2 and the building of dams on the Mekong River 
________________ 
 
 
 20 
currently planning to build 13 dams in the Yunnan Province. If plans go through, this will lead to a relocation 
of up to 50.000 people (Osborne, 2004 s. 12), the same has been seen while building dams on the tributaries 
in for example Laos (Hirsch, et al., 2006; Matsumoto, 2010).  
Another concern, which especially relates to the building of dams on the mainstream (but not exclusively), is 
that when altering the mainstream the consequences will be much more transnational. This means that the 
negative consequences is shared or even partly shifted from the country that benefits from the dam to 
countries downstream that does not.  
3.4 Summary 
The last decades has shown a rapid change of the Mekong River. Alarmingly current trends suggest that if 
the development which has shown in recent years is not seen too very soon, this could very well indicate a 
future total collapse of not only the fisheries in the Mekong, but also affecting agriculture, horticulture and 
aquaculture, which consequently will affect millions of people in both Lao PDR, Cambodia and Vietnam, 
whom is dependent on either or more of these to sustain their livelihood. The severity of the changes is 
increasingly apparent in the fact, that changes in the river have a certain delay, before the impact of these 
really can be measured, which alarmingly suggests that this might only be the tip of the iceberg calling for 
action now. 
In relation to hydropower dams, the human induced consequences seams severe. However development 
recent years, and the initiating of the investigation to construct dams on the actual mainstream suggest that 
governments still consider hydropower a preferred solution to meet increasing energy demands.   
There are many interests at stake, and many stakeholders trying to get their part of the „Mekong River Cake‟. 
Current year‟s rapid development causing increased need for energy in the SEA region has made 
construction of dams increasingly attractive to governments struggling to get their share in the region‟s 
economic boom. The question is, if this can be done in a sustainable way, recognising the need big 
population whom is dependent on their daily fish catch down the river. The following pages will draw in the 
history and current status of hydropower development on the MRB, further exemplified through newly 
finished Nam Theun 2 dam on the tributary in Laos which is the biggest hydropower project in the LMB so 
far. This will serve to understand which interests there are in the building of the hydropower dams, and how 
current planning and development are effectuated.  
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4. Hydropower dams 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the strengthening of the MRC in order to play a decisive role in the 
management of the sustainable use of the Mekong River. As just discussed the development on the river is 
developing in a highly unsettling way. To discuss how the MRC can be supported, we wish to dig into the 
case of the hydropower dams. 
4.1. The history of hydropower development in the MRB 
Damming plans on the Mekong River dates back as far as the 1950s, but was stalled as a result of years with 
war and political instability. However the original plans and the way of thinking energy production still play 
a profound influence on energy plans in the region today. (Imhof, et al., 2009 s. 2).  
As the region opened up in the 1990‟s the Asian Development Bank (ADB) established the Greater Mekong 
Subregion (GMS) program. The GMS consists of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Vietnam, Thailand and 
the Yunnan Province of China, Covering an area of 2.3 million km
2
. Under influence of the ADB, one 
among other key elements was to encourage regional cooperation in the energy sector by establishing a 
regional power-market primarily fuelled by hydropower. This should happen though the Mekong Power Grid 
-plan, fostering a complex network of high-voltage transmission lines which would open up mountainous 
regions in Lao PDR, the Yunnan province of China, and Myanmar. The energy should be sold to the growing 
economies of Thailand and Vietnam (Yu, 2006). In spite of enormous effort and investment by the ADB to 
push regional power trade and promote private sector involvement, progress has been slow and it is doubtful 
if the grid will ever be implemented as planned. (Middleton, 2009). 
Many promising alternative sustainable and social responsive energy solutions to meet the regions energy 
need already exists. These include both possibilities for a comprehensive reduction of energy consumption in 
the region and competitive alternative renewable energy solutions, such as biomass, wind and solar energy. 
However these have never been part of the regional Mekong Power Grid plan. (Middleton, 2009). Further the 
ADB‟s involvement in the regions energy planning, both as financier and government advisor, has never 
included or urged assessment of either the regions energy needs or the best option for meeting these needs. 
International best-practise standards, such as Integrated Resource Planning (IRP), which would take into 
account social, environmental and economic factors, have never been utilised. Especially „International 
Rivers‟ has raised huge criticism of this and calls for the ADB to take the opportunity to encourage a 
comprehensive planning model that would include these factors. (Imhof, et al., 2009 s. 2-3). 
While early attempts by the ADB through GMS to create a regional power grid plan, had been relatively 
unsuccessful, the SEA governments where each pushing forward their own plans of hydropower 
development, most of which were being developed without consultation with local communities, NGO‟s and 
other relevant involved parts of civil society. The plans where often pushed forward without opportunity for 
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public debate or assessments of the cumulative impacts on hydrology and ecology of the MRB, and again; 
without further consideration on alternative options to meet the regions energy needs, since these have never 
gained recognition in the governments of the riparian countries.  As a result of this alternative means still 
remains fairly under-developed. (Imhof, et al., 2009 s. 2-3; Middleton, 2009). 
4.2 Today’s order of business in the MRB Hydropower scene 
The hydropower developments took a short stall under the 1997 Asian financial crises, but are getting back 
on track again. Regardless of earlier criticism, hydropower infrastructure development plans are still being 
developed in the absence of any regional planning or decision making frameworks (Imhof, et al., 2009).  
Chinas rapid economic growth over the last decades has sparked an increased need for energy. By 2009, as 
an attempt to meet these sudden needs, China had built 3 large scale hydropower dams on the mainstream of 
the Mekong River, a further 2 where under construction and yet another 3 where planned (International 
Rivers, 2009). Further south, Thailand, Vietnam, Lao PDR and Cambodia, has also experienced a boom in 
their economies with a following rapid increase in the demand of energy. Over the last decades the energy 
demand in the GMS has grown annually with 10 to 15%. The increasing energy demands are especially 
evident in Thailand and Vietnam. Compared to 2009, Thailand is foreseen to double its demand by 2021, 
while Vietnam‟s energy demand is predicted to as much as quadruple by 2015. (Lee, et al., 2009 s. 11). The 
total energy demand of the GMS is predicted to grow from 131 TWh in 1997 to 600 TWh in 2020 (Yu, 2006 
s. 1222). The rapid growing demand for energy can be seen in the light of the enormous unexploited 
hydropower potential the region offers (see table).  
 
 
Source: (Yu, 2006) 
 
The majority of this increased need for energy is planned to be sourced from the building of hydropower 
dams in China, Lao PDR, Cambodia and Vietnam. Lao PDR and Cambodia recognising the increased 
demand and the big economic potential in this possibility, has accordingly stated their intention is to become 
the “Batteries of South East Asia”. Several dams have already been built on the tributaries, but construction 
on the mainstream of the Lower Mekong River (LMR) has so far been avoided. However, the investigation 
of 11 hydropower project of the mainstream is now being initiated (Appendix 2), which tells us that the time 
apparently has changed. Further to this, it must also be mentioned, that the predicted increase in energy 
demand is heavily contested by some energy analysts and civil society organisations in the region (Lee, et 
al., 2009 s. 11). 
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              (Source: http://www.internationalrivers.org/) 
 
What is peculiar about this, it that the region does not seem to have the capacity to handle a regional 
cooperation in power trade of this magnitude, as Xiaojiang Yu stated in her article from 2006 (Yu, 2006): 
1. National energy policies for the majority of the countries in the GMS are still focussed on domestic needs; 
2. No regional protocols to encourage power trade exist;  
3. Neither do policies which would ensure transmission ownership; 
4. Laws, regulations and contracts of the GMS are incompatible; 
5. Overall action plans to address social and environmental impacts of hydropower projects is non-existing; 
6. Technically; transmission facilities, coordination plan and operation protocols are absent; 
7. Institutionally; leadership to facilitate power trade is not established; 
8. Commercially and financially; trade tariffs, taxes, royalties as well as accounting and financing remains 
unaddressed.  
To what extend these are being dealt with now is unclear, but taking into consideration the relatively few 
years since Xiaojiang did her research, it seems implausible that all of these issues have been probably 
processed. On top of this comes political issues regarding national security in a region where cooperation and 
reciprocal thrust is yet to be embedded in the nation states. Economic issues of trade concerning risk-sharing 
and guarantees are still unclear and environmental and social policies concerning issues with mitigation of 
impacts of hydropower dams are not formulated (Imhof, et al., 2009; Yu, 2006; Middleton, 2009).  
Institutionally, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) was finally established in 1995 and builds on the 
Mekong Commission founded in 1957 on the general consensus that benefits could be gained from 
developing the waters of the Mekong, in particular through hydropower, navigation and irrigation. The task 
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of the later MRC was to secure a sustainable development in the MRB (MRC, 2010). However the MRC has 
been relatively vague in handling the few trans-boundary tasks it has been granted so far, and it‟s role in 
energy development in the region still seems extremely limited, as it appears ill-equipped to manage the 
massive scale investment the future foretells, as hydropower development in the MRB again is getting up to 
speed (Imhof, et al., 2009; Yu, 2006; Hirsch, et al., 2006). The role of the MRC is the aim of this paper, and 
will be thoroughly discussed in the following chapters. 
Finally a regional Electricity Power Forum (EPC) has been established alongside the GMS Experts Group, 
whom like the MRC has assisted in the discussion of issues among the member states with regard to energy 
development and trade. What is common for the tree of them, is that none are granted any legal status as 
neither are formally recognised, nor have they received any empowerment in regard to the coordination of 
planning, energy policies and administrative issues in the GMS (Yu, 2006 s. 1231-1233).  
4.3 Current trends in the hydropower scene 
In the most recent years, new players are starting to enter the scene of hydropower development in the MRB. 
Where the primary international actors used to be western corporations and multilateral banks as the World 
Bank and the ADB, the regional investment environment in the hydropower development scene are now 
being overruled by energy and construction companies from Vietnam, Thailand, China, Japan and Malaysia, 
whom primarily is financially supported by private banks from each their respective home country, followed 
up by promises of government guarantees through export-import banks (EXIM banks)
4
. The concern is, that 
these new stakeholders have not adapted to social- and environmental standards in their operations yet. 
(Imhof, et al., 2009 s. 4). This could help to secure long-term sustainable project outcomes, benefitting both 
the people directly and indirectly affected by the construction of hydropower dams, and environmental 
adaptation and mitigation. The fact is however that regional EXIM banks, and most other banks in the region 
besides being unaccountable to civil society, does not have any environmental policy. The OECD countries 
have established a set of Common Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Export Credits
5
, 
which the bank has not been willing to adopt so far. The same is the case for the Equator Principles (EPs)
6
. 
Contrary to development banks, projects financed by these are further not subject to public scrutiny (Imhof, 
et al., 2009 s. 5). 
In the light of this, the challenge now remains on how to ensure a sustainable and equitable development in 
the MRB. Undoubtedly, better planning and comprehensive options assessments would help to ensure better 
decision making processes and to identify the best options for meeting the regions energy needs.  
                                                     
4
 Government - or semi-government agency which commonly provides insurance cover to exporters against losses from non-payment by the importers, as 
a means to promote the country's foreign trade. Among offered services is also help in entering new markets.   
5
 Regarding environmental and social standards concerning projects supported by export credit guarantees or loans greater than US$15.3 million (more: 
http://tinyurl.com/2e8a44) 
6
 The Equator Principles are a voluntary set of standards for determining, assessing and managing social and environmental risk in project financing (see 
more: http://www.equator-principles.com) 
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5. The case of the Nam Theun II hydropower plant in Lao PDR 
As described in the chapter concerning the methodological consideration to this project, we intent to draw 
lessons from earlier dam projects in the basin.  
 
 
(Source: Internationalrovers.org) 
 
There has so far been no dam development on the mainstream in the LMB, but focus is laid on the Nam 
Theun II (NT2) project financed by a range of investors including both the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank. The project is interesting as it was lauded as a model project to pave the way for best 
practice hydropower development in the region (NTPC, 2010), further it is the most recent completed of the 
dams on the tributaries as it was only finished earlier this year. Digging into this case will therefore help us 
understand the most recent trends in the scene. Further the construction of the NT2 has received a wide 
criticism, making it further interesting to look into. 
The NT2 is the so far biggest hydropower dam constructed on Lao territory. As it can be seen below, the 
NT2 project both included a construction of a dam, inundation of the Nakai Plateau reservoir and a 
downstream channel. This will be explained detailed in the following sections.  
5.1 Overview of the NT2 project 
With Lao PRD as one of the worlds‟ poorest countries, the prospect of exporting power to Thailand and 
China is seen as a promising possibility for the country‟s economy to develop. As some has stated; the export 
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of energy from the Nam Theun II is the first real possibility for the Lao Government to ameliorate its 
dependence on foreign development aid (Power in Progress, 2009), as Thailand signed a contract to buy 995 
MW of power from the total production of 1088 MW from the dam. This aggregates to 33% of the total 3000 
MW the Lao Government by 2006 committed to sell to Thailand (BiC, 2006). The revenues are expected to 
account for 3-4% of total revenues for Lao between 2010 and 2020 (BiC, 2006). As exemplified here, the 
prospects of generating long-term revenues by exporting electricity to neighbouring countries are therefore 
promising for the troubled economy of the country. 
The total costs of the project held by the Nam Theun 2 Power Company Limited (NTPC) amounts to $1.45 
billion. The shareholders in the NTPC are the Lao Holding State Enterprise (25%), Electricity Generating 
Public Company Limited (25%), Electricité de France International (35%) and Italian-Thai Development 
Public Company Limited (15%). Among the 27 financing banks and institutions, the World Bank, the ADB, 
the European Investment Bank and Agence Française de Développement where involved in the project (BiC, 
2005). This clearly underlines the prominent involvement of transnational interests in the project, not only as 
financiers but also as shareholders. 
As mentioned, the Nam Theun II represents the World Bank‟s flagship in demonstrating sustainable 
hydropower development. The project is therefore linked to range of smaller flora and fauna conservation 
projects. The projects concerns; Forest Conservation and Management, Wildlife and Protected Areas 
Management, indigenous peoples‟ extractive reserves, irrigated and modernized, agriculture with 
experimental farms, electricity and new roads, mega-fauna running corridors and eco-tourism, sustainable 
logging and tree plantations, and new housing settlements. Further the project has been assessed by two 
independent evaluation teams with regard to potential impacts concerning environmental and social impacts. 
(Goldman, 2001). These where however the promising prospects and the good intentions as the project 
started rolling in 2001, whether the words lives up to what actually happened will be investigated in the 
following. However it is peculiar that the World Bank did not ask the MRC to do the assessments. 
When the dam finally stood finished in the first quarter of 2010, it had a long history of being subject to 
extensive reviews and delays because of the projects predicted social and environmental impacts. However 
the World Bank put a lot of effort into meeting the criticism and finally approved the scheme in May 2005. 
When it did so, by committing $270 million to the actual project and another $120 million in loans and risk 
guarantees, the ADB and others shortly followed along, facilitating the final initiation of the project (Hirsch, 
et al., 2006 s. 152). The final project is represented by the construction of a 39 meter high and 436 meter 
long gravity wall, which will create a inundation (the project planners call it catchment area) of 
approximately 4.039km
2
 in the latter part of the Nam Theun River (this is not illustrated on pictures). The 
water leads then to the 450km
2
 big Nakai Reservoir with an active storage capacity of 3.530 million m
3
. The 
total production of energy amounts to about 1080 MW which yearly provides the dam with the capacity to 
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produce approximately 6.000 GWh of energy, earning the Lao Government an average of $80 million a year 
over the first 25 years of the project period (NTPC, 2010).  
 
 
(NTPC, 2010) 
 
5.2 Complications 
Translated to social and environmental impacts, the flooding of the 4039km
2
 big catchment area will besides 
the forcibly displacement of 6.200 indigenous people mean the inundation of critical habitats for endangered 
wildlife species, such as the Asian elephant. Furthermore the altering of the flow in the Nam Theun River 
will also be crucial for the more than 80 species of fish (of which at least 16 are endemic) that used to live in 
the free-flowing river (Imhof, et al., 2009 s. 6). 
As it can be seen on the picture above, the NT 2 dam is a trans-basin conversion, meaning that it will alter 
not only the Nam Theun River, but also the Xe Bang Fai River. Once the Nakai Reservoir has been filled the 
water, it will be directed through a 350 meter drop to the power station before being led out into the Xe Bang 
Fai River. An estimated 120.000 people along the Xe Bang Fai River are now, or will be, affected by the 
construction, due to increased water flows, major fisheries and aquatic resource losses, erosion, flooding and 
sedimentation (Middleton, 2009; Matsumoto, 2010). According to International Rivers further 2.000 
households and 10.000 people have been directly or indirectly affected by construction activities here, as 
they have lost land, assets or access to natural resources (Matsumoto, 2010). The ADB, however reluctantly, 
have also recognised the enormous social and environmental impacts as far back as in 2004 (Norplan, 2004), 
as Norplan finished their Cumulative Impact Analysis. Nevertheless, as the World Bank President, Mr. 
James D. Wolfensohn (now former president), expressed himself “Our decision, after a lot of deliberation, is 
that the risks can be managed” (The World Bank, 2005). Whether this has been done effectively is so far 
Roskilde University, Spring 2010: the Role of the Mekong River Commission – Nam Theun 2 and the building of dams on the Mekong River 
________________ 
 
 
 28 
doubtful. The numbers above gives some kind of indication to the social and environmental magnitude of the 
project, and the further reading of this chapter will give even more implications that things were not as 
manageable as assumed by the former World Bank President. 
5.3 Planning  
As described a lot of good intentions where behind the Nam Theun II project, however some prospects of the 
dam building where maybe described a little to positively – for example when the World Bank agued for the 
displacement of the villagers to make room for the dam, and called it: “Improved housing (...) for the 6,200 
villagers who are resettling from the reservoir area;” (The World Bank, 2005). What are obviously a 
hardhearted underestimation of the populations‟ connection to their native homes, and the merry sound of 
tearing a whole community apart. On top of this is, that compensation payment and replacement lands given 
have often been inadequate, unfair and in some cases even nonexistent,. Further to this, the plans to restore 
the livelihood of the villagers has so far not been initiated and many people are now living in temporary 
houses, whit no prospect of moving on. Others have experienced that the soil they have been given are 
infertile, while former cattle farmers will have to recognise that the land does not support enough fodder, 
meaning that the buffalo population will have to be reduced significantly. So far there are no prospects of 
this improving neither. (Imhof, et al., 2009 s. 11; Matsumoto, 2010).  
All in all the planning and implementation process has been deficient. The planning process alone had 
violated six of seven strategic priorities
7
 of the World Commission of Dams (WCD)
8
 (Lawrence, et al., 
2005). These are:  
1. Gaining public acceptance,  
2. Comprehensive options assessments,  
3. Addressing existing dams,  
4. Recognising entitlements and sharing benefits,  
5. Ensuring compliance and; 
6. Sustaining rivers and livelihoods. 
It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss each of these in detail. However the “Analysis on the Nam Theun 
2 Compliance with World Commission on Dams Strategic Priorities” is enclosed (Appendix 1).  
Conclusively neither the World Bank, the MRC nor other international players really questioned the 
assumption put forward that the public interest of the people in Lao PDR was in line with that of the 
Government. Further to this, few have queried that the project, planning wise, where only considered a 
                                                     
7
 The Strategic Priorities of the WCD can be found here: http://www.unep.org/dams/documents/Default.asp?DocumentID=664 
8
 The WCD was brokered by the World Bank and the World Conservation Union (IUCN) in May 1998 in response to the escalating local and international 
controversies over large dams. Its main function is its mandate to 1.) review the development effectiveness of large dams and assessed alternatives for 
water resources and energy development; and 2.) Develop internationally acceptable criteria, guidelines and standards for the planning, design, appraisal, 
construction, operation, monitoring and decommissioning of dams http://www.unep.org/DAMS/WCD/.  
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national affair (Hirsch, et al., 2006 s. 153), which neglects the obvious downstream impacts that will affect 
the rivers and further the Mekong River Mainstream – causing the consequences to be felt even outside Laos. 
The only international agreements concerned funding bodies which could facilitate the project. Hence, the 
MRC and its member countries where never informed. 
5.4 Implementation 
In relation to the actual implementation process it is not only the resettlement setbacks which have stained 
the World Bank‟s “model project to pave the way for best practice hydropower development in the region”. 
But also the massive well-founded criticism (Lawrence, et al., 2005; Imhof, et al., 2009), which includes: 
1. Resettlement Setbacks, as mentioned above;  
2. Poor environmental management in the construction face; among other things the fact that road building has 
opened up for increased deforestation and a failure to control dust, erosion and sedimentation problems 
causing a serious deterioration in water quality and respiratory difficulties for the areas inhabitants. 
3. Poor guidance for affected villagers, and limited budget to compensate the more than 120.000 villagers that; 
a. Loose future options of relying on fish catch, let alone providing necessary alternative livelihood 
options.  
b. Need protection from predicted floods and erosion. 
4. Increased illegal logging and mining, in spite of the $30 million put aside to safeguard the Naki-Nam Theun 
protected area, as the construction has caused increased access to the area. 
5.5 The influence of the Mekong River Commission 
The first thing that comes to mind when examining this project is that the MRC in all the literature read is 
almost totally absent. This is especially peculiar, taken that it is the 4
th
 biggest dam project in the region, and 
the further, massive criticism of it. This alone tells us a lot about MRC‟s influence.  
All things considered, the absence of the MRC in the entire decision making, assessing and planning 
processes clearly illustrates the countries unwillingness to include the MRC and/or the MRC unwillingness 
or inability as a regional governance institution to influence the order of business in high profile and 
sensitive matters.  
As some has argued (Hirsch, et al., 2006), the fact that the Lao PDR Government needed foreign economic 
support to finance the project, would seem to create space for the MRC‟s involvement in negotiations and 
impact studies.   
Furthermore fact that neither the World Bank nor the ADB consulted the MRC Secretariat to do the impact 
assessments of the NT2, which is the heart of their business, are telling a clear story about the international 
community‟s view on the MRC and its international reputation - or the lack of same.  
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5.6 Lessons learned from the NT2 project 
The role of the MRC has been more or less non-existing in the planning, implementation and assessment of 
the just finished project. 15 years after the final establishment of the Commission, one would think that they 
would have gained some kind of international or at least regional reputation, which would make them a key 
actor in the Mekong River hydropower scene. This example however shows that they are not. Effectively 
they are barely a player at all. 
The many actors have given some kind of indication to the diversity of the interests in the hydropower 
development. How national interests of sustainable development will have to be measured up against 
interests of revenue, when decisions to build (or not) is considered. The Lao PDR Government has claimed 
that these increased revenues will be used to drag the country a little bit further out of poverty. But, as argued 
earlier, if the 11 proposed dams are built, the consequences will be severe not only for the people living in 
the immediate proximity from the dams, but most likely in the entire basin. On a long term people might be 
able to adapt to the „new river‟, however on the short term a decline in fish catch on up to 70%, as it has been 
experienced some places (Oxfam, 2008; Osborne, 2004 s. 35), will be devastating.  
In the wake of the intention to become the „battery of South East Asia‟ more projects is underway in Lao 
PDR and the goal of revenue seems to come first to the Government. However this appears like a short 
sighted and single minded solution on how to secure development and prosperity to the region. The 
economically troubled Government‟s commitment to hydropower generation highlights the need for action 
that can secure this happens in a sustainable way. 
Finally the example has shown how the private sector is getting increasingly involved in the hydropower 
development in the region. This emphasizes the need for the proper establishment of a regulatory regime to 
support the development, so social and environmental considerations are not elided. However the World 
Bank has received a lot of criticism on the dam, the question is whether the NT2 would have been built 
anyway, but with other investors, if the bank would have refused to part take? The fact that the World Bank 
was involved did at least secure some kind of commitment to social and environmental goals. If the project 
was financed by private international banks it is hard to say whether the safeguards and resettlement 
planning would have been done at all, not at least because international banks are unaccountable to the 
populations in the affected areas.  
 
5.7 Lessons to draw from other projects 
The Nam Theun has mainly been chosen, because it is the most recent. However we find it beneficial to draw 
in yet another few examples, where the MRC, after all, have played some role (or tried to). 
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5.7.1 Don Sahong 
When the 1995 Agreement
9
 was signed, the contracting parties promised to minimize and mitigate harmful 
effects that might occur to the environment. However the following example by Carl Osborne
10
, will show 
that this apparently is not always the first priority of Lao PDR. (Osborne, 2009). 
 
(Source: Internationalrivers.org) 
 
In 1990 the Malaysian company Mega First was given permission to build a dam just above the Khone Falls, 
in Lao PDR. The generating capacity would be between 240 and 360 MW. The project received massive 
protests as it is on the actual mainstream of the Mekong River, and ultimately will have severe negative 
impacts on one of the most important fish migration habitats in the river, and effect fisheries based 
livelihoods in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam (Osborne, 2009 s. 32). Taken into consideration the 
agreement to minimize harmful effects to the environment, what springs to eye, is that the Don Sahong Dam 
is part of former president Khamtay Siphandone project to construct a 2000-room luxurious hotel with an 18-
hole golf course and an airport big enough to land a Boring 737 aircraft. The Asian financial crisis 
temporarily stalled the project, but it is now up and running again, and the project has been announced to 
come into operation by 2013 (Osborne, 2009). The project is one of the 11 mentioned dams on the 
mainstream of the Mekong River, and taken into consideration how far the planning progress is, and that a 
date for operation has already been set, it seems implausible that it will not be completed – regardless the 
outcome of the MRC assessment, which is still not finished. 
As a response to an open letter by 34 environmentalists in May 2007 to the “responsible for the managing of 
the Mekong River Resources”, and later subsequent protests, the Cambodian National MRC sent an official 
                                                     
9
 Is described in the MRC chapter 
10
 Adjunct professor at the Faculty of Asian Studies at the Australian National University,   
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letter to the Laos protesting against the dam. The letter was ignored and hence, never answered. 
Consequently the MRC was urged by NGO‟s and the Government of Cambodia to produce an assessment on 
the impacts of the dam. The highly critical assessment was then given to the Lao Government, but has never 
been published, neither given any apparent consideration.  The Lao Government signed the project 
development agreement with Mega First, to proceed in 2008. As a result of the lack of response the 
Cambodian Prime Minister, Hun Sen, arranged a meeting with the Lao Government to discuss the Don 
Sahong Dam. Details about this meeting have never been aired publicly but the Cambodian National MRC 
was apparently subsequently told not to „engage in public criticism of the Don Sahong Dam proposal‟. In 
June 2008 the Lao Government then signed an additional agreement with the Mega First to take a 20% share 
in the project and finally later that month announced to the MRC the plans to build 7 other projects on the 
Mekong Tributaries. (Osborne, 2009 s. 31-34).  
Lessons learned 
As will be described more thoroughly in later chapters of this paper, many formulations in the 1995 
Agreement are so vague that keeping nations accountable to the original purpose of them is more or less 
impossible. Further it demonstrates how the very structure of the institution, implies that government-
officials in the MRC, are basically guarding themselves.  
This example therefore further highlights how the nature of politics sometimes also can be of personal 
character in Laos, which additionally complicates negotiations and management of the common in the 
region. The authors are here taking the freedom to additionally question whether nepotism is only evident 
Laos, or whether it is a current trend in the relatively new governments of the region?  
Hence, the example emphasizes how 1) Management are not always straight forward for the MRC, whom 
where publicly ignored and later admonished, when engaging in the building of the dam. The very fact that 
the Cambodian Prime Minister arranged a meeting with the Government of Lao to discuss the dam, and 
further that the MRC where rebuked not to discuss the dam publicly, however shows that 2) the MRC to 
some extend where being taken with some seriousness. 
5.6.2 The Se San River  
In this case we are not focusing on one specific hydropower dam. Instead we are investigating a cascade of 
dams at the Se San River. The purpose is to exemplify and briefly discuss how the MRC has handled some 
recent disputes between the riparian states over hydropower project. 
The Se San River rises in Vietnam‟s Central Highlands and flows westward into Cambodian and further to 
the Mekong River mainstream. Just around 70-80 kilometers before the Vietnamese-Cambodian border, the 
Se San River turns into a waterfall, the Yari Falls. Along the river from the Yari Falls and to the border are 
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constructed several dams. Among others the Yari Falls Dam, the Se San dam 3 and 3a. Besides plans exists 
to construct a Se San 4 and a Se Sam 4a. (Trandem, 2008).    
The construction of the Yari Falls Dam started in 1993. Even though this was before the establishment of the 
MRC, the Commission has been largely involved, primary as problem solver in disputes between the states 
of Cambodia and Vietnam. The Yari Falls Dam has in principal  been a symbol of all the dams along the Se 
San River, due to its dictating and inadequate implementing-process where the Cambodian Government and 
the civil society were included and due to the consequences observed in Cambodia. By May 2000 when the 
Yari Falls Dam was running on half capacity, the dam had already caused large-scale environmental, social 
and economic impacts to the communities living along the Cambodian riverbanks
11
. (Wyatt, et al., 2007). 
Presumably, these impacts must be even more serve today, as more dams have been constructed and the Yari 
Falls Dam is now working on full capacity. 
The Cambodian civil societies along the river have several times complained to the Cambodian Government, 
the Vietnamese Government and to the MRC. Negotiation within the MRC between the two riparian 
countries has shown that the Cambodian Government does not have sufficient technical and financial 
capacity to carry out scientific impact analysis (Trandem, 2008), and thus do not have the political power to 
confront the Vietnamese. In this regard an important element is that Vietnamese EIAs of the Yari Falls Dam, 
Se San 3 and Se San 3a have been made, but never where been presented for the Cambodian Government or 
the MRC. What is most interesting is that the MRC never tried to gain access to the EIAs or devised any by 
themselves. (Wyatt, et al., 2007).      
Lessons learned 
The Se San case demonstrates lacking capacity within the Cambodian Government, whom were unable to 
link the dams along the Se San River with the ecological and social impacts on the riverbanks. As 
demonstrated each country‟s capacity is therefore pivotal in securing that the agreement is lived up to. So is 
the power structure between the states expressed by the Vietnamese Government‟s ability to keep the EIAs 
confidential.  
Moreover the MRC have not been able to resolve the issue between the two riparian countries. Further this 
case highlight‟s the inability of the MRC Secretariat to assist the Government of Cambodia to prepare 
requested assessments. 
5.7 Summery 
Each member state has its own national interests and objectives in the river which they pursue. However, as 
exemplified by the above three cases, national economic interests are apparently the main driver for 
                                                     
11
 It have been observed up to one meter fluctuations of the river levels in a 24-hour period (Wyatt, et al., 2007).   
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construction of hydropower dams in the LMB. As Hirsch and Jensen (2006, s. 75) underlines; these national 
interests are rarely derived from actual problems whitin the country, like shortage of freshwater or pollution. 
On the other hand, they are often based on national interests in economic development extracted from the 
river.  
It is relatively rare that member states operate with one national interest, but often each country has different 
political and social interests. What is noteworthy is that development authorities tend to prevail over 
environment authorities. Sustaining the environment and care of the most vulnerable groups in the society, 
are therefore, to a large extent left to the civil society to deal with. (Hirsch, et al., 2006 s. 73-7).    
National interests in the MRC might not be that unusual or spectacular, but the question is how the MRC can 
cope with these diverging interests inevitably imbedded? The funding of the MRC was with a general 
expectation that the transboundary collaboration should not serve sectoral interests but the broad public 
interest - herein the poor and weak. However the MRC has failed in all 3 cases to do this.  
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6. Mekong River Commission (MRC) 
In the former chapter we explained how Nam Theun II decision-making process took place, criticising the 
absence of the MRC. Further we drew in a few other examples to clarify the actual role and influence of the 
MRC in the SEA hydropower scene. In this chapter we will clarify the history of the collaboration between 
the four riparian countries to the Mekong River and put a critical angel on the Mekong River Commission 
and its vague formulations under the 1995 Agreement. 
6.1 The history of the collaboration 
The Mekong resource collaboration between Thailand, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam has a long and 
turbulent history which can be traced back to the early 1950‟s when negotiations started. In 1957 The 
Committee was created based on a general consensus that benefits could be gained from the utilization of the 
Mekong River‟s resources, with a special focus on hydropower, navigation and irrigation. Because of the 
Vietnam War many of the development initiatives were put on hold or never implemented.   
In 1975 the Joint Declaration of Principles for the Utilization of the Waters of the Lower Mekong Basin was 
signed by the four states. The focus in the Joint Declaration was on extracting “resources of common 
interest”. To be sure that the extraction of the Mekong River was in common interests, the member states 
had veto power. (MRC, 2010).  
Once again the implementation of the 1975 Agreement was disrupted by political instability and conflicts. 
Vietnam, Cambodia and Lao PDR all underwent changes in their political regimes as the Vietnam War 
ended. A few years later, in 1977, the countries, except Cambodia which were under the rule of the Khmer 
Rouge, continued the cooperation under the Interim Mekong Committee. The Interim Mekong Committee did 
not succeed in developing a final agreement primary due to the fact that Cambodia was not a member of the 
committee and because of conflicts between Vietnam and Thailand. (Hirsch, et al., 2006). 
In the early 1990‟s the UNDP intervened in the negotiations and established a Working Group for further 
collaborations. The group developed the “Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of 
the Mekong River Basin”, later known as the 1995 Agreement12which represents the current objectives and 
principles for the cooperation. (MRC, 2010).   
Included in the Agreement it is written that the task of the MRC is “to cooperate in all fields of sustainable 
development, utilization, management and conservation of the water and related resources of the Mekong 
River Basin including, but not limited to irrigation, hydro-power, navigation, flood control, fisheries, timber 
floating, recreation and tourism, in a manner to optimize the multiple-use and mutual benefits of all 
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 Hereinafter referred to as the ’Agreement’.  
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riparians and to minimize the harmful effects that might result from natural occurrences and man-made 
activities” (MRC, 1995).  
In 2002 the MRC presented the second version of the Basin Development Plan (BDP). The BDP is a basin-
wide planning process outlining the guidelines for utilization of the River Basin‟s resources. It is the intent of 
the BDP to include a greater amount of stakeholders through the principle of Integrated Water Resource 
Management (IWRM), which has not earlier been prescribed. It is under the BDP that the indentifying, 
categorizing and prioritizing of the projects and the programs at the basin level takes place. (MRC, 2010).  
6.2 The structure of Mekong River Commission 
The structure of the MRC consists of three permanent bodies: The Council, The Joint Committee and The 
Mekong River Commission Secretariat. The Council consists of one member from each member country at 
ministerial or cabinet level and they meet once a year
13
. The Council makes the decisions about policies and 
provides other necessary guidance concerning the promotion, support, cooperation of joint activities and 
programs in order to implement the Agreement. The Council has the overall governance of the MRC. (MRC, 
2010). 
 
(Source: www.mrcmekong.org) 
 
                                                     
13
 Presently the delegates are; H.E. Mr Lim Kean Hor (Cambodia) (Minister of Water Resources and Meteorology), H.E. Ms Khempheng Pholsena (Lao 
PDR) (Minister to the Prime Minister's Office and President of Water Resources and Environment Administration), H.E. Mr Suwit Khunkitti (Thailand) 
(Minister of Natural Resources 
 and Environment) and H.E. Dr Pham Khoi Nguyen (Vietnam) (Minister of Natural Resources and Environment) (MRC, 2010). 
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The Joint Committee (JC) is responsible for the implementation of the policies and decisions of the Council 
and supervises the activities of the MRC Secretariat. Additionally the JC aim is to out form the contents of 
„Specific Agreement‟ between the riparian states, which we will explain later. The Secretariat provides all the 
technical knowledge and administrative services to the JC and the Council. (MRC, 2010).  
Under the three permanent bodies in the MRC, each country has a National Mekong Committee (NMC). The 
NMC‟s have no legal status at the regional level, but even so they play an important role in coordinating the 
work of the MRC with the riparian states. (MRC, 1995).   
Except from MRC‟s overall promotion of a sustainable development, the MRC is also involved in fisheries 
management, navigation, irrigated agriculture, watershed management, flood management, environment 
monitoring and exploring hydropower options. Especially the latter two tasks have recently become major 
topics on the agenda. (MRC, 2010). 
6.3 The 1995 Agreement and the cases 
In this section we will shortly explain the main objective and limits of the 1995 Agreement and how this is 
being expressed in the before mentioned cases. Special attention is drawn to the role of the MRC when 
member states plan projects on the LMB. 
Prior to implementation 
It is stated under the Agreement that states prior to implementation of major projects, either on the 
mainstream or on the tributaries, must notify the MRC JC and the other riparian states. This applies to 
projects which are expected to have transboundary impacts. However, how to control and monitor this prior 
to implementation is not noted in the Agreement. 
The applying state is furthermore obliged to provide detailed information and/or thorough assessment of the 
possible consequences that might be caused by the project, if other member states require it. This can be 
done by formulating a domestic „Impact Assessments‟ - possibly with help from the MRC Secretariat. 
However it is noteworthy that there are no legally-based standards for conducting those assessments included 
in the Agreement (MRC, 1995).  
There are further to this, no adequate mechanisms imbedded in the Agreement for resolving disputes (MRC, 
1995). In the case of the NT2 and the Yari Falls Dam, the Government of Lao PDR and the Vietnamese 
Government did not notify project plans to neighboring countries prior to implementation. Furthermore EIAs 
where not exposed to public opinion. In the case of the Yari Falls Dam this has later resulted in disputes 
between the Cambodian and the Vietnamese Governments. 
 
Roskilde University, Spring 2010: the Role of the Mekong River Commission – Nam Theun 2 and the building of dams on the Mekong River 
________________ 
 
 
 38 
No decisive power 
Overall it is the MRC JC‟s role to take facilitates discussions between the riparian states. If „no objection‟ on 
the proposed use of the Mekong River resources, it is the role of the MRC JC to formulate a „Specific 
Agreement‟ concerning the now approved project, to be signed by all the member states. In the „Specific 
Agreement‟ the MRC JC, “sets out agreed terms and conditions such as timing, quantity of diversion, etc.” 
(MRC, 1995). Legally none of the MRC organs have the power to reject a proposed project, which can be 
seen in the light of Article 26
14
 in the Agreement. Here it is noted that “the Joint Committee shall prepare 
and propose for approval of the Council, inter alia, Rules for Water Utilization and Inter-Basin 
Diversions…” (our underlining) (MRC, 1995). These rules are however after 15 years still not composed in a 
legally-binding manner. There have been a few attempts to clarify legal obligations though, where the latest 
attempts were in November 2003 under the BDP. The result was that the four member states signed - what 
have been called - informal procedures. (Hirsch, et al., 2006). 
This means that even through the governments of Lao and Vietnam had announced their project proposals 
for discussion at the MRC JC, the MRC would have had no decisive power to approve or disapprove the 
projects, as it is not included anywhere in the 1995 Agreement that the MRC can take any decisions 
regarding proposed projects. (Osborne, 2009). The MRC has in spite of that received a lot of faulty critic 
from the media and Non-Governments Organisation‟s (NGO) for not doing enough to sustain the bounty of 
the River Basin. It is on the contrary the task of the individual states to refuse or approve proposed projects 
by other states. Further emphasizing the necessity that the MRC are empowered to effectively handle 
disputes and/or deciding for the common resource, is what were also underlined by the cases; that states‟ 
political power in proportion to each other is not always equally shared.  
A more general issue concerning the Agreement is that there are no indications of which environmental and 
social standards the MRC are working according to. For example under Article 5 it is noted that the MRC 
shall support member countries to “utilize the waters of the Mekong River system in a reasonable and 
equitable manner in their respective territories…” (our underlining) (MRC, 1995), but how and under which 
standards, is not clear. It is noted that  
“where one or more States is notified with proper and valid evidence that it is causing 
substantial damage to one or more riparians from the use of and/or discharge to water of the 
Mekong River, that State or States shall cease immediately the alleged cause of harm…” (Our 
underlining) (MRC, 1995).    
                                                     
14
 Article 26: Rules for Water Utilization and Inter-Basin Diversions. 
The Joint Committee shall prepare and propose for approval of the Council, inter alia, Rules for Water Utilization and Inter-Basin Diversions pursuant to 
Articles 5 and 6, including but not limited to: 1) establishing the time frame for the wet and dry seasons; 2) establishing the location of hydrological stations, 
and determining and maintaining the flow level requirements at each station; 3) setting out criteria for determining surplus quantities of water during the dry 
season on the mainstream; 4) improving upon the mechanism to monitor intra-basin use; and, 5) setting up a mechanism to monitor inter-basin diversions 
from the mainstream. (MRC, 1995) 
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There is no doubt about that the utilization of the river basin‟s resources is presently used in a none 
“reasonable and equitable manner”. What “proper and valid evidence” is is not further elaborated, but as 
exemplified by the cases, it can be problematic to prove transboundary impacts in a volatile river basin and 
even through evidences are pretty clear, there are no mechanisms in the MRC there can cease the use of the 
River Basin‟s resources.   
6.4 Opening conclusion 
The 1995 Agreement and the revised Basin Development Plan pledges a holistic and equal extraction and 
management of the resources of the LMB. The idea is that sectoral interests shall not have first priority but 
instead sustainable development must be favored to the advantage of all the riparian states. However, the 
three cases illustrates that this is not always the case, and that the preconditions for this to happen is not in 
place. Especially the lack of decisive power springs to mind, as the MRC apparently has no way to enforce 
or even promote this in a reasonable maner. 
The cases presented in this report shows that the Lao and the Vietnamese Governments did not inform the 
MRC or other member states about their project plans before the implementation. Similarly they have to date 
not released the controversial EIAs to public opinion. The cases show, how the MRC is paralyzed when 
states ignore formal procedures, as they are lacking the ability to for example impose fines or sanctions when 
procedures, prescribed by the Agreement, are violated.  
Lacking authority is also predominant when it comes to the MRC‟s ability to approve or disapprove 
proposed projects. It is not mentioned anywhere in the Agreement that any of the MRC organs have an 
autonomous vote to proposed projects. None of the cases have been discussed prior to implementation in the 
MRC JC, but even if they were presented to the JC, the MRC would have had no autonomous vote and thus, 
no influence, to affect the order of business.  
Hence, the overall conclusion here is, that if the MRC is to live up to its appointed tasks – it need to be 
granted some kind of enforcing power. 
National interests 
The cases have shown that both national and personal interests are involved in the planning of hydropower 
projects. Hence, it is problematic when Council delegates are both represented in the MRC and in ministries 
of their home countries. Primarily because interests concerning domestic development can be in conflict with 
the negative transboundary effects the building of hydropower dams might have.  Like the Council delegates 
are representing national interests, so is the members of the Joint Committee, and so is the secretariat. This 
means that national interests can have impact on the way the Secretariat makes and state the EIAs. 
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Furthermore evidences tell us, that the construction of dams, primarily are to the benefit of the generally 
wealthier urban population, since plans for expanding the power grid is non-existent. This indicates that there 
is a risk that the benefit of hydropower development overrules goals of poverty alleviation, thus creating 
bigger boundaries between rich and poor in the affected countries.  
With the current structure of the MRC national interests are inevitable. This indicates how political capacity 
to persuade and force national interests is pivotal in the MRC decision-making. The Se San dispute between 
the Cambodian- and the Vietnamese Government, gives an example of how political power between states 
can overrule and vanish out opposition. A similar example is the case of the Don Sahong where the 
Cambodian NMC where silenced by the Lao Government - through the Cambodian Prime Minister – not to 
engage in criticism of the Don Sahong Dam proposal. Again denying the MRC any capacity at all.  
Hydropower projects on the Mekong mainstream 
As mentioned earlier; the MRC Secretariat is currently working on the final Strategic Environmental 
Assessments
 15
 to forecast social, economic and environmental effects caused by each of the 11 proposed 
dams. By now, preliminary assessments have already stated that dams build on the mainstream of the LMB 
will have enormous consequences for the millions of people living on the riverbanks. The question if any of 
the MRC organs have power to refuse or even affect the decision-making in regard to the proposed projects. 
Claiming that the MRC‟s influence on mainstream dams might be bigger than on dams on the tributaries is 
faulty. According to the Agreement there are no distinction between mainstream projects and projects on the 
tributaries if they are expected to effects on the mainstream. However, there are indications of that 
construction of the Don Sahong Dam has already been decided, which makes the Secretariat‟s assessments 
more or less redundant – Further highlighting the hollowness of the MRC.  
Included in the Agreement it is written that the MRC‟s aim is “to cooperate in all fields of sustainable 
development, utilization, management and conservation of the water and related resources of the Mekong 
River Basin...”, but as now explained, the MRC organs have no tools or means to achieve this goal. Below is 
listed this chapter‟s main findings: 
1. No clear environmental and social standards in the 1995 Agreement. 
2. The MRC have no decision power to refuse project proposals or to impose fines or sanctions when procedures 
are violated. 
3. No plans to solve disputes between states exist nor does plans for mitigating between strong and weak states. 
4. The MRC is only accountable to the member states and not to the population itself. 
5. There are no impartial members of either the MRC Council or the MRC Joint Commission.   
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 Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) is a system of incorporating environmental considerations into policies, plans and programmes. 
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If the MRC are to meet the overall goal for a sustainable development, at least two things needs to be 
changed; 1) the structure of the MRC, so both the Council and the Joint Commission consist of impartial 
members or at least members whom are not also representing national governments, herein national interests; 
hence separating the MRC from the government. And 2) a reformulation of the 1995 Agreement, so it 
becomes a binding commitment where the MRC organs has power to either totally refuse proposed projects 
with great environmental or social impacts - or at least is granted the power to impose fines and sanctions, 
where states violate agreed procedures. Overall this means that states will have to surrender some kind of 
power to the MRC. The question on how to makes states surrender that sovereignty is discussed in chapter 8, 
after the theoretical framework. When the MRC is finally empowered, the lack of standards will have to be 
dealt with. This, however, is unimportant as long as the MRC is as weak as it is today. 
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7. Theoretical framework 
A little untraditionally we have chosen to present the analytical framework just before the analysis. However 
this is done because we found it beneficial to reconnoitre the field of research thoroughly first in order to 
finally define the proper theoretical approach to the problem. The field of research suggests that the member 
states unwillingness to surrender sovereignty should be the subject off analysis, however we found theories 
on sovereignty a little to monotonous, which is the reason we sought knowledge on how to strengthen the 
MRC in other camps than only the political science.  
In the methodological chapter of this paper, we have mentioned how we see the MRB as a Common-pool 
resource (CPR). Initially we find it helpful to investigate the term a little further, but before doing so, it is 
important to emphasize that we are aware that each country may have some kind of regulation nationally of 
the River Basin‟s resources. However, between the states, the River Basin is a CPR as will be argued here. 
The investigation of the term naturally leads us into the discussion and defining of our analytical framework 
regarding the governing of the commons – or the struggle to do so. 
7.1 The Mekong River Basin a Common-pool resource 
Definition of a common pool resource: 
 
“Common pool resources (CPR) are characterized by the difficulty of excluding actors from 
using them and the fact that the use by one individual or group means that less is available for 
use by others. (The latter point distinguishes CPR from pure public goods which exhibit both 
non excludability and non rivalry in consumption).” 
(Source: http://www.greenfacts.org/) 
The MRC member states have recognised that the river is a common pool resource. However, even though, 
the cases here have shown that states are neglecting or ignoring negative social and environmental 
consequences both nationally and internationally. The following will discuss the resource system. The 
purpose is mainly to argue that the MRB is a common resource. 
The resource system is defined by the way users have or does not have de facto access to use a certain good 
or resource. Ostrom
16
 et al. (2007; 1994) argue for at least four types of goods or resources which are a part 
of the resource system; private-, public-, toll- and common-pool goods or resources. These four types of 
goods are determined by the two terms; excludability and subtractability.  
                                                     
16
 Ellinor Ostrom won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2009 for her analysis of economic governance, especially on the commons 
(http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2009/press.html) 
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Excludability refers to the possibilities of excluding other users from the resource, for instance through 
fencing, packaging or trough legitimate rules. Subtractability relates to the amount or degree in which the use 
of the resource subtracts units from the resource. For example the fisherman‟s catch in the river are not 
available for the other fishermen, which might result in a subtraction depending on the fish‟s regeneration 
rate. Contrary there is no subtraction when the farmer uses the sun‟s energy to grow his crops.  
The private good are characterized by the relative simple way of exclude other users from the good in an 
economic and legal sense and by subtraction of the good which are dependent on the owners use of the good. 
A public good are more or less the opposite of a private good since exclusion is difficult and since there are 
no subtraction of the good. Toll goods are, like private goods, characterized by the fact that they are easy to 
exclude others from. (Ostrom, et al., 1994). 
Common-pool resources are characterized by the fact that exclusion is often difficult, however what 
dissociate them from public goods as subtractability does occur (Ostrom, et al., 1994), or explained in 
another way, “a common-pool resource is a resource for which there are multiple owners (or a number of 
people who have nonexclusive rights to use the resource) and where one or a set of users can have adverse 
effects upon the interests of other users” (Baden, et al., 1998). In the figure below are the four types of goods 
or resources visualized, determined by excludability and subtractability.   
 
 
As explained in the previously chapter the MRC member states has agreed that project proposals with 
transboundary impacts must be approved by the remaining states (de jure). This indicates that there should be 
some control of the use of the River Basin‟s resources, suggesting that excludability exist. It is however 
contradictory to this, that if the individual states choose not to obey, there are no consequences. In practical 
terms (de facto), this suggests the opposite: that exclusion is non-existent, or at least difficult. 
When assessing subtractability of a given resource, the resource‟s regeneration rate is important. As long as 
the number of resource units deducted from a resource does not exceed the regeneration rate, the resource 
stock will not be exhausted (Ostrom, et al., 1994), hence no subtraction is occurring. But what does 
subtracting mean in terms of the MRB? When talking about hydropower dams, there might not be an actual 
subtraction of the water resources, but rather a relocation or transformation of the resources – suggesting that 
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there is no subtraction. The water is not subtracted from the river, when building a dam, however, the 
construction and running of the dam has a lot of consequences for example on fish stocks – suggesting that it 
does subtract resources from the MRB, however externally. As we are looking at the MRB as a resource 
supplying people along the river banks with food, we also consider the construction of dams a subtraction of 
the resource. 
To sum up, in practical terms (de facto) there are no or very little exclusion to the MRB, suggesting it to be 
either a common pool resource or a public good. However, the fact that subtraction occurs dissociate the 
latter. This underlines what was claimed earlier; that the Mekong River Basin is considered a Common Pool 
Resource. De facto it is however not treated like such. The following chapter will discuss the tragedy that 
occurs when the common resources are not managed properly.  
7.2 Tragedy of the commons 
We have argued that the Mekong River Basin is a common-pool resource. The following section will discuss 
the classical understanding of „the tragedy of the commons‟ presented by professor of Biology at the 
University of California, Garret Hardin (1968). The section elaborates the risk of the exploitation of common 
resources.  
„The tragedy of the commons‟ was originally presented to argue for humanity to surrender the freedom to 
reproduce, in order to prevent the degradation of an earth with limited resources in its ability to bear human 
existence. Additionally his work argues for further management of common goods via increased government 
involvement and/or through international regulatory bodies. He believes nature favours individuals who 
exploit the common-pool resources at the expense of more restrained users. (Hardin, 1968). 
The term, „Tragedy of the Commons‟ refers to the situation where multiple individuals that act 
independently, rationally and solely consulting their own self-interest, together will deplete a common-pool 
resource, even through if it‟s in none of the affected parts interest for this to happen. Hardin presents an 
example with a pasture open to all. Rationally each herdsman will keep as many pieces of cattle on the land 
as possible, and keep adding cattle - even if he knows that the land will reach its carrying capacity and might 
be temporarily or even permanently damaged. This of the simple reason that, for each herdsman the equation 
of adding an extra (succeeding) cow, will bring him the positive benefit of (nearly) + 1, while the negative 
component of -1, created by the further effect of overgrazing, are shared by all in the common. Consequently 
the only sensible thing for the herdsman (and all the other herdsmen) is to add one additional animal, and 
another one, and another one... (Hardin, 1968) - therein is the inevitable tragedy of the commons, as it will 
also be felt in the MRB as long as regulatory precautions or arrangements are not properly in place. 
Roskilde University, Spring 2010: the Role of the Mekong River Commission – Nam Theun 2 and the building of dams on the Mekong River 
________________ 
 
 
 45 
Tragically Hardin further argues that attempts to voluntary manage the CPR often fall short, not at least 
because of free-riders. Here he uses bank robbing as an example. The robber acts if the bank was a 
commons, and Hardin asks whether verbal appeal to his sense of responsibility will keep him from doing it - 
probably not. Hardin suggests the only sustainable solution to be the implementation of measures that keeps 
the bank from becoming a commons. In his words, “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority 
of the people”. An example we all know could be the current taxing of parking spots for short term parking, 
and fines for long term parking. In doing so, the user is not forbidden to park, but his temperance is 
persuaded by the expense imposed on him. Even though he does not like paying taxes, he accepts it because 
he recognises the need to institute and support them in order to escape ’the horror of commons’, where 
conscienceless users would exploit the resource. (Hardin, 1968). Without suggesting taxis to be the right 
means, this however suggests that people willingly pay compensation as long as they understand that it is for 
the greater good. At the same time, it also suggests that heightening the expenses related to the utilization of 
the common resource will alleviate the use of it.  
7.2.1 Mitigating the tragedy 
To sum up the previous chapter, Hardin encourages strict governance through mutual coercion and 
regulations, as the means to avoid depletion or degradation of a CPR. This way of thinking has been the 
prevalent assumption for a long time. For example Baden and Noonan (1998) made it clear that “in the 
absence of clear, exclusionary rights to the resource and of a coordinating arrangement based on some rule 
other than that of willing consent, a scarce resource will be unnecessarily depleted”. Within this rational 
approach it is pre-given that each individual are seeking its own profit-maximizing.   
The solution to the „tragedy of the commons‟ has to a large extent been a discussion of either a promotion of 
private property regimes or promotion of a common property regime. These two regimes have in the 
literature been assumed to be each other‟s contradiction. (Baden, et al., 1998). By far the only way to avoid a 
depletion of the resource has been a transformation of the common property regime (or open-access regime) 
to a private property regime. R. Smith put it this way; “the only way to avoid the tragedy of the commons in 
natural resources and wildlife is to end the common-property system by creating a system of private property 
rights” (Smith, 1981). The reason for this claim, might be regarded to the following three characteristics; 1) 
the common-property regime have been criticized for, entail an individual strive to capture the products of 
the resource before others do, 2) high transaction and enforcement costs expected if communal owners try to 
devise rules to reduce the externalities of their mutual overuse, and 3) because no one has an incentive to 
work hard in order to increase their private returns.  (Ostrom, et al., 2007). 
But the question is if private property regimes necessary are more efficient or if it is at all possible to 
implement in a river basin. First of all the additional benefits from exclusion, or placing restrictions on use of 
the resource, might be smaller than the additional costs to enforce them, which gives the private owner no 
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incentives to do so. (Ostrom, et al., 1994). It is regarding to this reasonable to assume that the additional 
enforcement costs might be greater than the actual gains in the MRB due to difficulties in protecting the river 
basin. If this would be the case the (de facto) resource system will not be affected by a change in the (de jure) 
resource regime. Secondly, case-studies tells us that there are no clear evidences that tells us that private 
property regimes are more effective to govern a resource than a common-pool regime (Ostrom, et al., 2007).   
Thus, changes in the resource regime through a transformation from a common-property regime into a 
private property regime might not be a solution. Instead we are within this approach working on 
strengthening the design of the institutional arrangements and strengthening coercions. In the absence of 
clear, exclusionary rights to the resource a scarce resource will be unnecessarily depleted (Baden, et al., 
1998). 
7.2.2 Surrendering sovereignty 
The conclusion is then, that in order to secure a sustainable development of the common resources, some 
kind of regional governing is necessary.  As the MRB is shattered over several countries, and as agued in the 
previous chapter, the need for a supranational organisation (SO) to govern the common, is therefore is 
preferred. In order for this to work, member states need to surrender sovereignty to it. This section will 
discuss the term sovereignty briefly before digging into what could make states surrender it. 
Sovereignty is basically the supreme independent and inalienable right of the state to decide over its own 
territory. It rests on a political fact that for which no purely legal right can be provided. Embedded is the 
power to rule and make laws (Arnauldde Sartre, et al., 2009). 
The presented cases and the former discussion on the MRC, has clearly shown, how the MRC and its 
member states are basically paralysed when states choose not to follow their mutual agreement. This happens 
partly because the 1) formulations in the 1995 agreement are too vague, and 2) partly because none of the 
states have been willing to surrender sovereignty to a level where consequences could be put upon them if 
they choose to ignore the agreement. When we ask how to strengthen the MRC, we therefore have to ask: 
What makes states surrender sovereignty? 
Basically there are 3 schools of theories suggesting why states would delegate power. States motivations are 
according to these: Geo-political or Power-based interests (the realist school), Economic interests (the liberal 
school) and the ideational interests (the constructivist school) (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, et al., 2008 s. 103). Our 
intention is neither to discuss these against one another, nor to go thoroughly into this. However we find is 
useful shortly to present these in order to discuss, how the MRC can create incentives for the states to 
surrender power.  
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Motivations for power sharing: 
1. Geo-political interests: These include the wish for national security, for example through cooperation 
empowering smaller states against external enemies, such as stronger threatening neighbours. 
Another power-based reason to surrender sovereignty can be found in the hegemonic stability 
theory, where states surrender independence as they consider the benefits of delegation power to a 
dominant state (or institution) higher than the costs of conflict – ex. conflicting interests. 
2. Economic interests: The belief that interdependence will lead to economical benefits, either through 
reducing transaction costs and manage negative policy externalities and/or to manage or remove 
barriers for economic growth.  
3. Ideational interests: Where the former initiatives where build on materialistic interests the ideational 
approach to sharing power is build on mutual identification, which happens through processes of 
social learning and communication, fostering thrust and shared identities among populations in 
different countries.  
7.3. The Socio psychological approach 
Earlier it seemed that the “tragedy of the commons” was inevitable everywhere not owned privately or by a 
government, but evidences have shown that a wide diversity of adaptive governance systems have been 
effective stewards of many resources (Dietz, et al., 2003). Mark Van Vugt suggests, in his article „Averting 
the Tragedy of the Commons: Using Social Psychological Science to Protect the Environment‟ from 2009 
that four key components can be identified for successful resource management: Information, identity, 
institutions and incentives. These correspond, to a large extend to four core motives for decision making in 
social dilemmas: Understanding, belonging, trusting and self-enhancing. He provides us with the following 
table to give an overview:  
 
(Source: Van Vugt, 2009) 
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7.3.1 Information/Understanding 
Optow and Weiss (2000) emphasizes the need for reliable information in order to make the public 
understand the contingency between their action and its outcome. This is particularly important, as 
environmental uncertainty tends to promote overuse as most users, when uncertain, choose a state of either 
optimism over the future, causing them to underestimate the damage they do (Van Vugt, 2009 s. 170) or 
denial, morally eliminating the need for action (Opotow, et al., 2000 s. 476pp). 
Further to this, the complexity of global environmental trends amplifies this uncertainty, and fuels the 
problem, while information on local problems on the other hand, is easier to understand, because the link 
between doings and outcome can be more directly seen. In addition it seems that people are easier to 
persuade to make efforts to conserve the environment, when they believe their contribution makes a 
difference. (Van Vugt, 2009).  
Dietz et al. (2003) explain that environmental governance to a large extent depends on good, trustworthy 
information about stocks, flows, and processes within the resource systems being governed, and on the 
information about the human-environment interactions affecting those systems. At the risk of high 
aggregated information may ignore or average out local information, it is important to collect and model 
local and aggregated information about resource use and the conditions.   
At last, Dietz et al. argue that effective governance requires not only factual information about the state of 
the environment and human actions but also need information about the inevitable uncertainties adapted in 
the science. Scientific understanding of human-nature relations will never be complete (Dietz, et al., 2003) 
and depends on the scientist‟s point of origin and his objects.  
7.3.2 Identity/Belonging 
As gregarious animals, humans have a deep congenital feeling of belonging in social groups. This is evident 
in the way we form attachments with other individuals or compare ourselves and our doings to others.  The 
need to belong to a group is strongly embedded with an in-group/out-group psychology. The strength of our 
social attachment to the social groups we identify with, further determines the effort we are willing to put 
into the wellbeing of the community. (Van Vugt, 2009).  
An important aspect is the individuals concern of their in-group reputation, which in combination with the 
competition between individuals, can be used as a motivator to promote pro-environmental action. On the 
other hand, studies has also shown, that competition between communities over shared resources, such as 
river irrigation systems or fisheries, seems to cause an increased risk of the depletion of the resource (Van 
Vugt, 2009), which can roughly be explained through Hardin‟s „Tragedy of the Commons‟, discussed earlier. 
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When it comes to communities, it therefore appears that a super ordinate social identity, which can be 
created over the common understanding of for example shared values or threats, such as the risk of collapse 
of the local economy, is much more environmentally beneficial when working with commons. 
7.3.3 Institutions/Trusting 
As Hardin points out, voluntary attempts to govern the commons often fall short because of the fear of free-
riders. Instead authorities must play a key role in governing the commons. However, especially when talking 
about global matters, a key issue is – who is prepared to thrust or empower them, granting them the power to 
effectively implement and make decisions necessary? Another obstacle is the dilemma of; who guards the 
guards?  
In this, it is therefore essential for authorities to gain thrust. To do this, they must apply fair decision making 
rules and procedures. Further, studies have shown that regardless if people receive good or bad outcomes, 
what is essential to gain their thrust, is that they are treated fairly and with respect. (Van Vugt, 2009 s. 171).  
Furthermore effective governance requires that the rules of resource use are generally followed up with 
reasonable sanctions when modest violations happen. Again what is crucial is that, whom who impose the 
rules must be seen as effective and legitimate by resource users or resistance and evasion will overwhelm the 
commons governance. (Dietz, et al., 2003). 
At last institutional arrangements must be complex, redundant, and nested in many layers. Examples of 
governance of resources that rely exclusively on imposed markets or one-level, centralized command and 
control have often been failed. Governance should instead employ mixtures of institutional types that employ 
a variety of decision rules to change incentives, increase information, monitor use, and induce compliance. 
(Dietz, et al., 2003).   
7.3.4 Incentives/Self-Enhancing 
Self-enhancing motives for a pro-environmental change of action are, however altruistic one would wish to 
think about other human beings, most often driven by an incentive to either gain rewards or avoid 
punishments. When talking about the environment monetary incentives schemes seems particular appealing 
to both private households and within industry. However not everybody is equally motivated by economic 
self-interest. Studies have shown that economic incentives are less important, when other core needs are 
fulfilled. Households with strong community relationships for example, seem more prone to taking 
environmental action that will benefit the community, than households that does not. Further, schemes that 
fulfil several core needs however seem more effective, while incentive schemes that undermine core needs, 
on the other hand, can be directly counterproductive (Van Vugt, 2009 s. 171-173). 
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7.4 Summary 
In this chapter we have combined several theories to give some indications of how the MRC can be 
strengthened in its task to promote a sustainable development of the MRB‟s resources. This analytical 
framework, and the key components found here will constitute the skeleton of the analysis in the next 
chapter. 
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8. Analysis 
The analysis of the report has been done on an ad hoc. Initially the field analysis has defined interests, and 
conflicts in the LMB hydropower scene. The purpose of this chapter is to pull the strings together, and 
discuss it up against our theoretical framework. 
In the opening conclusion after the Chapter on the Mekong River Commission we suggested that 1) the MRC 
got detached from the states, and that 2) they got empowered through binding agreements. However in order 
for the MRC to take this role, states need to be ready to surrender sovereignty to it. In the following section 
we are focusing on how the MRC can gain more power to influence political decisions.  
Finally we discuss whether the MRC is the right organization to lift the huge responsibility to promote the 
sustainable use of the MRB‟s resources, or if there are other means? 
8.1 Empower the Mekong River Commission 
In order for the MRC to take the lead in the sustainable governing of the Mekong River, states needs to 
provide the MRC with the possibility to uphold binding agreements accepted by the riparian states. The 
delegation of national sovereignty to a mutual governance, is a naturally means. As explained in the former 
chapter, we are in this report working with three national incitements to surrender sovereignty; Geo-political 
interests; Economic interests; and Ideational interests. This is done because we see the surrendering of 
sovereignty essential to strengthen the MRC. The question is whether incentives to do so exists or can be 
provided by the MRC? 
The South East Asia countries have a long and turbulent recent history of intern and extern strives. The result 
is that corporation historically has been very limited, and unlike the case of Europe, thrust has yet to settle to 
the neighboring countries. This mistrust can be a serious hindrance to the establishment of common rules and 
institutions, as authorities are not always seen as legitimate and/or fair. This was also obvious in the 
presented cases where states are not including neither the MRC or each other in project planning, thus 
ignoring formal arrangements concerning the agreement to inform and include member countries when dam 
development can or will have transnational consequences. This was even more evident in the case of the Se 
San dams, where the Vietnamese Government decided to exclude the Cambodian Government, when the 
latter asked to see the completed EIA‟s. 
In order to overcome this obstacle, the generation- and enhancement of thrust in regulatory bodies are 
essential. MRC needs to establish the belief that its doings are for the common good of the entire region, and 
that the maintenance of the Mekong River as a resource is of everybody‟s interest. Hence, reducing 
environmental and social uncertainty, by making states understand the contingency between their action and 
outcomes.  
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No doubt, that the way the riparian states in common are utilizing the resources of the MRB at the moment is 
not sustainable in a long perspective. There are unquestionably some economic benefits by exporting 
electricity to neighboring countries in a short perspective, but taking into consideration must be the depletion 
of the fish resources, inundations and altering the flows of the rivers with fatal consequences for the people 
living on the riverbanks. In a longer perspective the revenues originating from exporting electricity will 
probably be diluted by the cost of increased poverty.  
The environmental and social cost of each hydropower project might be shared by several countries (both 
up- and downstream), however, the overall long term costs are going to be fatal; „the tragedy of the 
commons‟. In this lie the inevitable economic incentives to a mutual and agreed utilization of the resources. 
As Hardin underlines, the commons are often exploited on the expense of more restrained users, which in 
reality, could induce that this win-win situation might seem a little too optimistic or at least hard to achieve, 
due to the risk of free-riders.  
Another economic incentive to sign a binding commitment could be donor-money – or states fail to 
commitment a possible decreasing donor-money. The lack of progression in the MRC‟s governance, have 
questioned the justice of giving millions to the organization. Especially Mørch (2006) has raised doubts 
about the 90 million Danish Crowns which have been given from 2004 to 2010 to enhance the MRC and the 
collaboration in general (UM, 2007). So if no binding commitment is signed by the riparian states and that 
attitudes in general are not altered, the future flow of donor founds might be fragile. 
If the MRC could succeed in establishing the belief that it is in the interest of everybody to sustain the 
ecology of the river, states could meet and create a social identity of being interconnected, sharing the same 
interest, with the possibility to create a win-win for the entire region. Hence the dissemination of knowledge 
can lead to an improved and broadened sense of community between states, securing the acceptance of 
common rules and institutions, while securing economic interests as future barriers or obstacles to economic 
growth through collaboration and common regulation to ensure the common resource could be avoided.  
Inherited in „the tragedy of the commons‟ is a belief of economic self-interest, which also relates to Vugt‟s 
views when he states that: the competition over resources often leads to over-exploitation. If states 
acknowledge the mutual benefits of collaborating – among other thing the possibility to avoid the depletion 
of the resource - this would to some extend be to follow their self-interest. Conversely Hardin‟s theories 
suggest that this motive cannot be trusted, and that regulation is necessary. However; the shared economic 
interest, and maybe also the shared feeling of belonging, hence creating ideational incentives, might create 
the needed incitement for states to surrender sovereignty in order to empower the MRC to govern the 
resources of the river. When the MRC has been empowered, for example by states signing binding 
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agreements, it would have the opportunity to further push for sustainable development by creating additional 
economic incentives for instance through punishing overuse and rewarding responsible use.  
If cooperation in managing the resources of the MRB in a sustainable way, it might also be possible and 
beneficiary to cooperate in other geo-political issues like national security, bilateral trade agreements just to 
mention a few. Within this reconciliation could be an assumption that cooperation for a mutual development 
in the region would further stabilize the political stage – inducing incentives for the establishment of the 
corporation that takes an offset in geo-political interests of national security. Of cause, creating geo-political 
incentives to delegate sovereignty might not be that plausible in a short perspective.    
8.1.1 Realistic? 
The way for MRC towards sustainable governance of the Mekong River Resources seems long and 
troublesome, however the collapse of the fragile ecosystem seams just around the corner. Because of this; it 
does not seem plausible that the Mekong River Commission will be able to lift its appointed tasks within a 
reasonable future, due to states lacking unwillingness to surrender sovereignty. 
Consequently, we chose to ask; what is a realistic solution, which can be applied within a reasonable 
timeframe then? –That means – before it is too late? 
 
8.2 Alternative solutions to ‘the tragedy of the commons’? 
Recent year‟s development has shown a shift from international donor support to finance projects in the 
region, to the financiers being more regional players such as EXIM banks backed up by states whom are 
interested in either selling or buying hydropower. International donors are tied by international standards 
when assessing hydropower projects, and furthermore are kept responsible by the international community 
and home countries if the project entails serious environmental and/or social consequences. As presented 
earlier, regional EXIM banks are not. One way of contributing to a sustainable development in the region 
could be for the international community to put pressure on regional financiers to frame environmental 
policies and sign international standard agreements such as OECD countries agreement on „‟Common 
Approaches on Environment and Officially Supported Export Credits‟. 
MRC is a relatively new institution; hence the building of trust in it will take years. Furthermore it builds on 
principles of securing the sustainable development of the River Basin and alleviating poverty. These are both 
difficult and hard-to-accomplish tasks, which require comprehensive capacity. The question is, whether it 
would be more beneficial to incorporate the MRC into one of the already existing trusted institutions 
operating in the Basin, such as ASEAN? In the case of the NT2, financiers refused to sign the final 
agreement as long as the World Bank had not, which indicates, that big trusted and legitimate institutions can 
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have some influence to affect the order of business in the MRB. The advantage of integrating the MRC into 
broader organizations is backed up by Vugt, when he argues that institutional arrangements are much more 
powerful when they are nested in many layers.  
  
Roskilde University, Spring 2010: the Role of the Mekong River Commission – Nam Theun 2 and the building of dams on the Mekong River 
________________ 
 
 
 55 
9. Conclusion 
As it has been pointed out in this report, national governments have not been prepared to delegate 
sovereignty to a shared regional governance of the MRB‟s resources. This have primary been because of a 
general concern for national economic interests and, as exemplified in the Don Sahong case, because of 
personal interests imbedded in the national governance. A violent past has carried mistrusts between the 
riparian states and have hindered a regional cooperation. The region has likewise been characterized as a 
divided region, where the overall assumption has been how to utilize the resources before it is exhausted by 
the others use.    
Unfortunately there seems to be very little hope for compiling a set of binding commitments to the riparian 
states within the next years. This might entail that the construction of several of the 11 proposed dam project 
on the Mekong mainstream – herein the construction of the Don Sahong Dam as explained. Creation of a 
mutual understanding of the long-termed gains derived from collaboration is nearly non-existing, and the 
lack of positive future prospects in the MRC‟s governance is alarming. It seems that a realization of how 
environmental degradations can lead to economic stagnation is a prerequisite for a regional collaboration for 
a sustainable development.  
Until this realization is established, the question is to which degree the local populations can adapt to the 
„new river‟. In a long perspective local populations have in general showed great ability to adapt changes in 
their daily life, which might likewise not be unrealistic along the Mekong River and its tributaries. However, 
within the next decades, construction of dams on the Mekong mainstream will no matter what, induce huge 
consequences for the most vulnerable groups.     
9.1 Dependency and national interests 
An issue which has only been touched peripheral is the issue of national security and hydropower dams. 
Currently the region is highly dependent on the import of oil and gas from neighboring countries, such as 
China and Singapore. To take the example of Vietnam, Vietnamese importers spent 577 million USD on 
purchasing 921.000 tons of oil and petroleum last month (Mar-April 2010). The total consumption in 2009 
amounted to 12.6 million tons costing importers a total of constituted 6.3 billion USD (CPC News, 2010). 
The prospects of securing the nation‟s energy demand partly through hydropower seems promising, as not 
only massive economic benefits can be gained, but also because Lao, Cambodia and Vietnam seems to be 
able to free themselves from being dependent on other nations for energy. This alleviates earlier problems for 
the nations related to for example national security in a region which until recently was troubled by conflict.  
However, the story has two sides. With the recent development other nations, Thailand in the Case of the 
NT2, are on the other hand increasing their dependency on foreign energy import. Partly because no 
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agreements exist so far on transmission ownership, which could secure energy supply if conflicts should 
arise in the future (Yu, 2006).  
9.2 Alternative options to meet the regions energy need 
As mentioned in the chapter on hydropower dams, investigation in alternative means of meeting the regions 
increasing energy need seems highly uninvestigated. Both Vietnam and Thailand, being big spenders of 
energy, has great potential of reducing consumption, while the region in general has several promising and 
competitive renewable energy options, such as biomass, solar and wind energy. It is peculiar, why Thailand 
for example is so keen to import energy, and increase its dependence on foreign energy import instead of 
utilizing its own resources for energy production. Recent trends in Thailand however suggests that this might 
be changing now, as civil society groups are starting to organize in order to demand comprehensive IRP 
processes, pushing Thailand to reform its power planning. (Imhof, et al., 2009 s. 2 and 14). 
9.3 The uncontrollable China 
The methodological chapter has explained that we in this paper are ignoring the importance of China, as they 
are not members of the MRC whom we are working with. It is however extremely problematical that they 
are not. China is besides Tibet the country of origin of the Mekong River and hence the first country that the 
river travels through on its way down through the region. As mentioned up to 40% of the dry season flow in 
the entire river seems to stem from China. As long as China refuses to become a member of the MRC, and 
taken into consideration the comprehensive dam development on the Mekong River in China today, it is 
questionable how much an empowered MRC would be able to do to secure the ecology of the River. If the 4 
member countries united, the pressure on China to act responsibly would however be much stronger than it is 
today. 
Furthermore, in order to include China in the MRC they would as well need incentives. What would 
persuade China to partake equally with the existing members is questionable, not least because the part of 
China where the river runs through is mainly inhospitable for living anyway. In order to persuade China, the 
idea presented in the analysis concerning integrating the MRC in a bigger and more comprehensive 
corporation would make it much more feasible for China to join along. 
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Strategic Priorities 
 
Executive Summary 
 
By Aviva Imhof, International Rivers Network and Shannon Lawrence, Environmental Defense  
 
Updated February 2005 
 
 
The World Commission on Dams (WCD), an independent, multi-stakeholder process sponsored 
by the World Bank and IUCN, was established to review the development effectiveness of large 
dams and assess alternatives; develop a framework for assessing options and decision-making 
processes for water and energy services; and develop internationally acceptable criteria and 
guidelines for planning, designing, construction, operation, monitoring, and decommissioning of 
dams. In November 2000, WCD Commissioners released their final report, Dams and 
Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making. 
 
The World Bank has stated that it will use the WCD report “as a valuable reference to inform its 
decision-making process when considering projects that involve dams.”1 Additionally, World 
Bank donors, in the 2002 report of the Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) 13th 
Replenishment, “noted the Bank’s early support for the World Commission on Dams and asked 
that IDA take into account the core values and strategic priorities suggested by the WCD for 
preparing and evaluating dam projects.”2 In November 2004, IUCN members – including 
governments and non-governmental organizations – adopted a motion on “Financial institutions 
and the World Commission on Dams recommendations.” This recommendation urges financial 
institutions to assess all proposed dam projects in the context of WCD strategic priorities and to 
decline support for dam projects that do not respect WCD strategic priorities.3 It is with these 
statements in mind that the following analysis has been prepared. 
  
Nam Theun 2 is the largest and most controversial of the hydropower projects planned for Laos. 
Situated in Khammouane Province in central Laos, and only approximately 40 km upstream 
from the already completed Nam Theun-Hinboun Hydropower Project, the $1.3 billion BOT 
(Build-Operate-Transfer) scheme is being developed by three companies in association with the 
Government of Laos (GoL). In November 2003, the Nam Theun 2 Power Company (NTPC) 
signed a power purchase agreement with the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 
(EGAT), paving the way for the project’s development.  NTPC and the GoL are awaiting a 
decision on financial assistance and guarantees from the World Bank, which are necessary to 
secure financing from other commercial lenders and public institutions. The World Bank is 
expected to take a decision on whether or not to support Nam Theun 2 before May 2005.4  
 
 
                                                
1 The World Bank, “The World Bank and the World Commission on Dams Report Q&A,” March 2001. 
2 World Bank Executive Directors, International Development Association, Additions to IDA Resources: Thirteenth 
Replenishment, Supporting Poverty Reduction Strategies, July 2002, p. 18. 
3  IUCN RECWCC3.087  “Financial institutions and the World Commission on Dams recommendations,” approved 
November 2004.  Available at: http://www.iucn.org/congress/members/adopted_res_and_rec/REC/RECWCC3087-
%20REC024%20Rev.pdf. 
4 The power purchase agreement deadline for reaching financial closure is May 8, 2005, after which date NTPC will 
be required to pay penalties to EGAT. 
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An analysis of Nam Theun 2’s compliance with the WCD strategic priorities shows that the 
project fails to comply with six of the seven strategic priorities outlined in the WCD report. On 
this basis, it is recommended that the World Bank should not provide guarantees and other 
assistance for Nam Theun 2, but instead should work immediately on developing alternative 
plans for conserving the watershed area and improving the livelihoods of people living on the 
Nakai Plateau. 
 
Strategic Priority 1 – GAINING PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE 
 
The overall thrust of the WCD’s approach is that there needs to be a fair, informed and 
transparent decision-making process. The right of indigenous peoples to free, prior and 
informed consent must be recognized. Access to information and legal support is key for 
affected communities and agreements should be negotiated based on informed participation.  
 
For such a process to exist, there must a well-developed civil society, access to independent 
sources of information, and the ability for local people to have informed input into the process 
without fear of retribution. Unfortunately, such a political climate does not exist within Laos. 
There is no independent media in Laos, and there are no independent local NGOs. The 
government continues to commit serious human rights abuses, and critics have been arrested 
and imprisoned. The legal system is at a rudimentary stage of development and there is no 
independent judiciary. In such a political environment, it is difficult to see how a truly open and 
participatory decision-making process could take place.  
 
More than 6,200 indigenous people living on the Nakai Plateau will be resettled to make way for 
the dam. While numerous discussions have occurred with communities living on the Nakai 
Plateau, the processes that have taken place are not compatible with the concept of free, prior 
and informed consent as defined by the WCD and by international human rights conventions. 
The decision to build the dam was made and logging on the Plateau commenced well before 
those affected were involved in any participation processes. Most of the discussions with 
villagers have occurred in the context of improving resettlement outcomes, rather than debating 
whether or not the project is appropriate or desirable. Furthermore, affected communities have 
not had access to independent legal or other professional support.  
 
More than 100,000 people living along the Xe Bang Fai will be affected by increased water flow 
in the river. Discussions on the project with Xe Bang Fai villagers were only initiated in mid-2004 
and many people have still not been consulted about the project, let alone given their consent or 
agreement to it.5 There continue to be questions about the accuracy of information that has 
been presented to Xe Bang Fai communities regarding the negative impacts that the Nam 
Theun 2 dam will have on the river. 6 
 
The Lao population as a whole is affected by the risks assumed by the government for Nam 
Theun 2, in terms of debt incurred, management of project revenues, and the project’s 
environmental and social impacts. There has been no meaningful public participation process or 
open and informed debate amongst Lao society as a whole, despite more than a decade of 
project preparation and several staged meetings in Vientiane.  
 
                                                
5 Nam Theun 2 Social Development Plan, November 2004, Vol 1, Ch. 4, p. 26. 
6 See, for example, http://www.namtheun2.com/faq/faq_env.htm and Les Amis de la Terre, Campagna per la Riforma 
della Banca Mondiale, Bank Information Center, and Environmental Defense, “NGO Visit to Nam Theun 2 
Hydroelectric Project in Laos,” December 2003, p. 6. 
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Of all the groups who will be affected by the Nam Theun project, communities who live 
downstream from the dam site and fish in the Nam Theun and its tributaries seem to have been 
the least informed about the project. These villagers rely on fish and other aquatic products for 
income and food supply, and rank these activities second or third in terms of household food 
security after rice and vegetable cultivation.7 The project developers now admit that at least 
1,500 families living along the lower Nam Phao will experience 60 percent declines in their fish 
catches as a result of the project.8 With flows to the Nam Theun reduced to 2 cubic meters per 
second (cu m/sec)  – which represents only a fraction of the natural flows in the river– impacts 
on fisheries are likely to be severe. However, most of these communities have yet to be 
consulted about the Nam Theun 2 project.   
 
Consultations with villagers whose lands and assets will be acquired permanently or temporarily 
for project construction were only initiated at the end of 2004 and have not yet been completed.9 
As with other villagers in these areas, they have only recently received information on Nam 
Theun 2 and have not given their free, prior and informed consent to the project. 
 
Strategic Priority 2 - COMPREHENSIVE OPTIONS ASSESSMENT 
 
The World Bank has been promoting the dam as an income generator for Laos since 1986. Yet 
no participatory, comprehensive assessment of alternatives to hydropower as a means for 
generating foreign exchange has ever been completed for Laos. The Nam Theun 2 Study of 
Alternatives simply compared various power export schemes, all except one of which were 
hydropower projects. The claims that Nam Theun 2 is the best means of protecting the 
watershed area, of providing sustainable livelihood options for Nakai Plateau villagers, or even 
of generating foreign exchange for Laos, are not based on a comprehensive and participatory 
analysis of alternatives as called for by the WCD. For example, the limited economic information 
that is available about the project indicates that the revenue streams for Laos are projected to 
total no more than 5 percent of government revenues until 2019.10 There has been no 
assessment of lower-risk options that might generate similar revenue streams for the country. 
 
There is no evidence that Nam Theun 2 is the best option for meeting Thailand’s needs for 
energy either. According to research conducted by the Energy Committee of the Thai National 
Economic and Social Advisory Council, EGAT– the buyer of Nam Theun 2’s power – has 
overestimated energy demand growth in its Power Development Plan for 2004-2015, which 
includes the purchase of power from Nam Theun 2. Additionally, a study commissioned by the 
World Bank but never disclosed shows that feasible demand side management, energy 
conservation measures, and renewable energy generation in Thailand would “exceed the output 
of NT2 and would provide energy to the customer at a cost approximately 25% less than NT2.”11 
This World Bank study and the Alternative Power Development Plan produced by the Thai 
National Economic and Social Advisory Council indicate that there are less expensive options 
for meeting Thailand’s energy needs than Nam Theun 2.  
 
 
 
                                                
7 Nam Theun 2 Environmental Assessment and Management Plan, Addendum, Riparian Release Study, January 
2005, p. 3. 
8 Ibid, Table x-13.  
9 Ibid, Vol 4, Ch. 6, pp. 2-3. 
10 World Bank, “Nam Theun 2 Economics Interim Summary Report,” August 21, 2004, p. 18. 
11 “Nam Theun 2 Hydropower Project: Impact of Energy Conservation, DSM and Renewable Energy Generation on 
EGAT's Power Development Plan,” August 28, 2004.  
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Strategic Priority 3 – ADDRESSING EXISTING DAMS 
 
WCD guidelines stipulate that outstanding issues with existing dams must be resolved before 
additional dams are built in the same river basin. The Nam Theun-Hinboun dam, located 
approximately 40 km downstream of the proposed site of the Nam Theun 2, was funded by the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) and completed in 1998. Theun-Hinboun has had severe 
impacts on the livelihoods of more than 25,000 people living downstream and upstream of the 
dam, including declines in fish catches of between 30 and 90 percent, destruction of vegetable 
gardens and dry-season drinking water sources, loss of fish nets and increased difficulties with 
transportation.  
 
For the past four years, the Lao-based Theun-Hinboun Power Company has invested significant 
resources in mitigation measures and compensation for the impacts of the Theun-Hinboun 
hydropower project. While the company has made “good progress,”12 according to a third-party 
review panel, there are serious concerns about the effectiveness and long-term sustainability of 
its program to restore affected people’s livelihoods. The panel found that “the poorest sectors of 
the impacted communities, and those heavily reliant on living aquatic resources for their 
livelihoods and diets … have not been adequately included in project activities to date.”  
 
Additionally, roughly 9,000 villagers have been impacted by the Asian Development Bank-
funded Nam Leuk dam in central Laos. They have suffered losses to drinking water supplies 
and fisheries. Fish catches reportedly dropped 50 to 95 percent along the Nam Leuk and Nam 
Xan rivers after the dam was completed. As a result, the ADB says it is “quite possible” that 
families “lack alternative income sources and adequate protein intake.”13 Without recourse 
mechanisms, affected communities had nowhere to turn when promises were broken.  
 
Furthermore, when Nam Leuk was approved, the ADB boasted that 1 percent of export 
revenues would be used to protect Phou Khao Khouay National Park, one of the country’s most 
important protected areas and home to endangered tigers and elephants. However, inadequate 
management of the park and improper disbursement of funds has threatened the long-term 
sustainability of Phou Khao Khouay. These issues will likely remain unresolved until the ADB 
establishes clear mechanisms to ensure compliance with social and environmental conditions 
after projects have been completed. 
 
Another 23,000 villagers have been affected by the Nam Song, Nam Mang 3 and Houay Ho 
hydropower projects. They have suffered losses in terms of food security, cultural heritage, 
water supply and other aspects of their daily lives. If the GoL, ADB, and the dam developers 
cannot ensure that Lao citizens affected by much smaller hydropower projects are adequately 
compensated for their losses, then it is difficult to see how the World Bank can guarantee that 
those affected by Nam Theun 2 will not be left worse off.  
 
Strategic Priority 4 – SUSTAINING RIVERS AND LIVELIHOODS 
 
The WCD states clearly that there must be good baseline information gathered over several 
years before a decision to build a dam has been taken, and that dams should provide for 
environmental flow releases to help maintain downstream ecosystems. Independent technical 
reviews of the Nam Theun 2 project’s social and environmental plans indicate that sufficient 
                                                
12 Draft Final Review of the Environmental Management Division for Theun-Hinboun Power Company Limited, 2004. 
13 Asian Development Bank Operations Evaluation Department, “Project Performance Audit Report on the Nam Leuk 
Hydropower Project in the Lao PDR,” 2004. 
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baseline data on critical aspects such as hydrology, fisheries, and water quality has not been 
collected.14  
 
The review of the project’s hydrologic data found the analysis to be so deficient that it is 
impossible to predict how much water will be available for power generation.15 The reviewers 
determined that the lack of long-term stream flow and rain flow monitoring, coupled with 
questionable statistical analysis techniques, makes Nam Theun 2 “high risk for meeting its 
power generation predictions and for estimating potential project impacts.” In addition, the 
project developers have undertaken no analysis of how global climate change might affect flows 
in the Theun River.  
 
Professor Guy Lanza, who reviewed the water quality data for the project, found that the 
baseline water quality data provided for the project area is extremely limited.16 The data is not 
sufficient for estimating water quality changes in general, or for accurately calibrating water 
quality models. Specifically, the lack of adequate data available for the project area prohibits 
accurate predictions of the water quantity and quality changes that will occur in the proposed 
Nakai Reservoir, as well as in the Nam Theun, Nam Kading, Xe Bang Fai, Nam Kathang, and 
Nam Phit rivers. 
 
One of the major concerns is the impact of the Nam Theun 2 dam on the fisheries of the Nam 
Theun, Mekong and Xe Bang Fai rivers, which sustain the livelihoods of more than one million 
people in central Laos. The official prediction of fisheries impacts for the downstream rivers is 
based on only three field surveys, all conducted during the dry season. As a result, fish species 
present in the Xe Bang Fai are likely underestimated and no study of fish migrations in either 
the Nam Theun or Xe Bang Fai river basins has been undertaken. The environmental 
assessment also ignores the importance of other aquatic organisms in the riverine ecology and 
food chain, and therefore fails to consider the implications of the loss of these resources for the 
food security and livelihoods of the people of the Xe Bang Fai basin. Baseline studies on 
existing livelihoods of communities living along the Xe Bang Fai will only be completed after 
project approval. The measures proposed by NTPC to mitigate and/or compensate villagers for 
the impacts described above appear to be, in many cases, misguided, untested or inadequate.17 
 
Downstream of the dam on the Theun River, NTPC has guaranteed a minimum release of only 
2 cu m/sec, a fraction of the water volume naturally available in the Nam Theun.18 This figure 
was selected based on financial considerations before a riparian release study was even 
conducted. This could not possibly be considered sufficient to maintain downstream ecosystem 
integrity as recommended by the WCD. In fact, the Nam Theun 2 Social Development Plan 
admits, “it is assumed that most of the current fish population will disappear, due to the changes 
                                                
14 Technical reviews available at: http://www.irn.org/programs/mekong/namtheun.html 
15  Peter Willing and Karla Knoop, “Review of Hydrology Component Of Environmental Assessment and Management 
Plan (EAMP) For Proposed Nam Theun 2 Hydropower Project,” January 20, 2005. Available at 
www.irn.org/prorams/mekong/namtheun.html. 
16  Professor Guy Lanza, PhD, “Review of the Water Quality Assessment (EAMP), Proposed Nam Theun 2 
Hydroelectric Project,” February 2005. Available at: www.irn.org/prorams/mekong/namtheun.html. 
17 David Blake, “A Review of the Nam Theun 2 Environmental Assessment and Management Plan as it pertains to 
impacts on Xe Bang Fai fisheries,” January 2005; and David Blake, “A Review of the Adequacy of Compensation 
Measures for Communities Living Along the Xe Bang Fai River, Nam Theun 2 Hydropower Project, Lao PDR,” 
January 2005.  Available at: www.irn.org/prorams/mekong/namtheun.html. 
18  According to latest draft of the EAMP, average discharges in the Nam Theun at the dam site range from a low of 
31.9m3/sec in the dry season to a high of 734 m3/sec in the wet season (Nam Theun 2, Environmental Assessment 
and Management Plan, November 2004, Ch. 3, p. 45.) 
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in hydrology and hence in natural habitats.”19 It is not clear what compensation and mitigation 
measures will be available to which villagers in the Nam Theun downstream area.  
 
Finally, the impoundment of the Nam Theun to create a massive reservoir will have significant 
impacts on fisheries on the Nakai Plateau. Many migratory and riverine fish species will be 
unable to thrive in the reservoir. However, the Social Development Plan presents the Nam 
Theun 2 reservoir fishery as one of four livelihood options for the 6,200 people displaced by the 
project, which is a “is a precarious gamble at best” given that the reservoir could be “largely 
devoid of life except for invasive aquatic weeds and small islands of survivor fish species near 
the tributary mouths.” 20    
 
The paucity of research and analysis undertaken thus far makes it difficult to predict just how 
serious the impacts of the project on fisheries, and therefore on communities’ livelihoods, are 
likely to be. However, using the impacts at Theun-Hinboun as a guide, it can be assumed that 
Nam Theun 2’s impacts on fish populations and resource dependent communities are likely to 
be severe. The mitigation and compensation options for displaced and downstream villagers – 
from reservoir fisheries to aquaculture to community-based production forestry – are largely 
untested and have a high risk of failure.21 There are no contingency plans or guarantees for 
communities if these proposed livelihood measures fail. 
 
Strategic Priority 5 – RECOGNISING ENTITLEMENTS AND SHARING BENEFITS 
 
The WCD states that the risks for all people affected by the project should be assessed prior to 
project approval. The risks for the thousands of people living along the Xe Bang Fai who are 
expected to lose their fisheries and other livelihood sources has not been calculated as part of 
the project's risk assessment. The WCD also requires that all adversely affected people 
negotiate formal and legally enforceable agreements guaranteeing their rights. This has never 
occurred for Nam Theun 2, and the concept of a legally enforceable mitigation agreement 
between affected peoples and project developers is virtually unheard of in Laos.  
 
Furthermore, there are no independent organizations in Laos that are able to monitor the project 
and the commitments made by the GoL and NTPC if the project goes forward. The legal system 
is not sufficiently developed to provide possible remedies for affected people should the 
commitments made by NTPC and the GoL fail to materialize. The only avenues for independent 
monitoring are through international NGOs or other observers based outside the country, a poor 
and unacceptable substitute for local civil society groups and community-based monitors. 
 
Strategic Priority 6 – ENSURING COMPLIANCE 
 
During project preparation, the World Bank has been unable to ensure compliance from the Lao 
government on key issues such as logging. Despite World Bank stipulations to the contrary, the 
Nakai Plateau has been heavily logged, and logging has even occurred in the community 
forestry areas designated for the resettled communities. If the World Bank is unable to ensure 
compliance with conditionalities imposed prior to project approval, it is difficult to see how the 
Bank will be able to ensure compliance once money and guarantees have been disbursed and 
the project is under construction.  
                                                
19 Nam Theun 2 Social Development Plan Addendum, January 2005, Vol. 3, Ch. 1, p. 6. 
20 Eric Theiss, “Reservoir Fisheries Predictions for the Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project,” Sustainable Environment 
Foundation, February 2005. Available at www.irn.org/prorams/mekong/namtheun.html. 
21 For more information, see Nam Theun 2 independent technical reviews available at 
www.irn.org/prorams/mekong/namtheun.html. 
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While the Concession Agreement outlines the GoL’s and NTPC’s obligations for social and 
environmental mitigation measures and some performance bonds have been proposed, there is 
no independent legal system in Laos through which these commitments to affected communities 
can be upheld. Based on past performance, serious doubts persist about the GoL’s commitment 
to meet these obligations or other conditions imposed by the World Bank. Recent World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund, and ADB reviews have documented the GoL’s commitment and 
capacity failures leading to missed reform targets and unfulfilled commitments. 22 There is no 
indication that World Bank loan disbursements or guarantee enforcement for Nam Theun 2 will 
be linked to fulfillment of GoL and NTPC obligations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
22 See, for example, World Bank Operations Evaluations Department, Project Performance Re-Assessment Report, 
Lao PDR, Second Structural Adjustment Credit, June 24, 2004; International Monetary Fund, Staff Report for the 
2004 Article IV Consultation, November 17, 2004; Asian Development Bank, Technical Assistance to the Lao PDR for 
Preparing the GMS: Nam Theun 2 Hydropower Development Project, November 2003; IMF Fiscal Affairs 
Department, Lao PDR Public Expenditure Management Reform, 2003; and World Bank, Asian Development Bank, 
IMF, Lao PDR Public Expenditure Review, 2002. 
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Strategic Environmental Assessment on proposed hydropower dams
In the wake of the last years increased need for energy in the GMS, interests to utilise the potential for hydroelectric energy from
hydropower dams on the mainstream of the Mekong River has augmented. As mentioned, a total of 11 proposals have been raised by
the private sector and by governments to build dams on the mainstream. Below the proposed locations are visualized.
(source: www.internationalrivers.org)
Both the international community and civil societies have raised broad and well-founded concerns about the subsequent
consequences the dams will have, if they are built. As a response, the MRC Secretariat is working with the governments “to develop
coordinated and integrated impact assessments, consistent and fair mitigation measures, and hydropower development strategies
and policies”. (MRC, 2010).
In September 2008 the MRC Secretariat convened a regional stakeholder consultation on hydropower to oblige the increasing
interests in construction and the use of hydroelectric power dams on the Mekong mainstream. The Secretariat gathered a group of 17
experts in fish migration, biology and ecology from 10 different countries as an attempt to undertake a preliminary environmental
assessment of the proposed hydropower dam projects. The expert group’s main findings are summed up below (MRC, 2010):
- Existing mitigation technology (fish lifts, fish ladders and ‘artificial rivers’) cannot handle the scale of fish migration on the
Mekong mainstream,
- Dams in the middle and lower LMB will have the largest impacts on fisheries and the largest economic and social costs,
- Dams higher in the basin and on tributaries will have relatively less impact on fisheries production,
- If dams are built upstream and on tributaries, specific mitigation measures should be designed from the start and integrated
into dam engineering and operation,
- In considering the design of mitigation measures existing off-the-shelf designs cannot be used, but the basic concepts used
in developing these can be drawn upon.
Finally the MRC has launched a 14-months Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) process for the 11 proposed hydropower dam
projects. The SEA’s aim is to identify the potential opportunities and risks. As an attempt to oblige negative criticism, the SEA has
established forums on the MRC’s homepage, on which various stakeholders can engage in and provide inputs to the SEA. To an
extension of that a “particular emphasis is given to the importance of looking at the proposed dams as a group and the cumulative
impact from an integrated basin-wide perspective...” The conclusions of the SEA are expected to be presented in late 2010. (MRC,
2010).
